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ABSTRACT
The subject of this study is the thought of Edmund Burke and 
M ichael Oakeshott whose theories are taken to be the most articulate 
examples of c l a ssical and modern conservatism.
It is a study within conservatism: their thought is examined and 
criticised by e v a l u a t i n g  how it effects the o v e r a l l  coherence of 
conservatism; it is c e r t ainly not the purpose of this inquiry to 
establish the absolute v a l i d i t y  of the theories of either Burke or 
O a k e s h o t t .
Where this coherence is found inadequate suggestions are made to 
strengthen, in the authors view, the cons e r v a t i v e  case. It is 
c o n c luded that c o n servatism is based on a desire to utilise tradition: 
but this does not mean that conserv a t i s m  is an a l t e r n a t i v e  to pol i t i c a l  
ideologies. Conserv a t i s m  is i tself an ideology and takes as its task 
the critical appraisal of tradition.
It is argued that the first principle of conservatism ought to 
be the rejection of absolute knowledge, and not the denial of the 
proper powers of human reason. As no political theory can claim 
absolute validity, society should be open to all ideas that are 
prepared to altercate under the rule of law. In this way the richness 
of tradition is a l l o w e d  full expression and consequently society, and 
conservatism, is given greater coherence.
A STUDY OF CLASSICAL AND MODERN CONSERVATISM 
The Political Thought of Edmund Burke and Michael Oakeshott
That thou mayst rightly obey Power, her bounds know;
Those passed, her nature amd name's changed; to be 
Then humble to her is idolatry.
John Donne
Seek True Religion
Introduction
If one had no purpose other than the reverence of language, the 
thought of Edmund Burke and Michael Oakeshott is a rewarding subject 
indeed. It is u t t erly appropriate that their l o v e  of tradition in 
Britain should find expression, in part, in emotive language. Yet this 
is not the whole; Burke and Oakeshott also incarnate the spirit of 
British c o n s e r v a t i s m  on the two occasions it has been most articulate. 
They have no equal.
The primary m o tivation for the conserv a t i s m  of Burke and 
Oakeshott - and indeed for all c o nservatism properly conceived - is 
found in the rejection of absolutism. In Burke's time the spectre was 
the radicalism of the French revolution; for Oakeshott the great 'isms' 
of this century, p a r t i c u l a r l y  communism and fascism, are the enemy. In 
repudiating absolutism Burke and Oakeshott deepened their reverence for 
the British constitution and the tradition it embodies. A number of 
ramifications stem from this, with the conception of human reason, and 
hence man's ability to shape his own world, being the most important. 
Burke held the c l a s s i c a l  view of reason and choose to emphasise even 
more strongly than was perhaps required the limitations on human
conduct. Oakeshott's phi l o s o p h i c a l  position, in contrast, i n i tially 
appears more pregnant with optimism; but as will be seen the practical 
issue is deeply sceptical.
The deep sense of scepticism in the thought of Burke and 
Oakeshott presents certain dangers. How can man c r i t i c a l l y  perceive 
and e v a l u a t e  his tradition if his cognitive powers are so weak? Is 
tradition dependent on man or is it instead autogenous and merely 
awaiting objective disco v e r y ?  As man's critical powers are questioned 
a b e lief in disposition - as a primary mover - emerges in the thought 
of Burke and Oakeshott. The practical effect of this is a profound 
satisfaction in the British constitution. As far as Burke and 
Oakeshott are concerned, in Britain a c o n s e r v a t i v e  can glory in hi3 
given tradition; consequently, it must be inferred that there is little 
worth in prosel y t i s i n g  this glory if it cannot be sustained by positive 
experience. C o n s e r v a t i s m  does not travel well: it teaches only by 
positive examples. Therefore, if freedom does not exist imminently in a 
society it cannot s imply be imposed. It can be argued that this 
scepticism is mitigated in the thought of Burke by a b e l i e f  in natural 
law. If the law of mor a l i t y  is uni v e r s a l  it is p o ssible to argue that 
certain forms of p o l i t i c a l  behaviour may also be catholic insofar as 
they reflect this order. Not so with Oakeshott, his is an unchecked 
scepticism and he denies the existence of u n i v ersal natural law.
These are some of the major points of contention to be examined. 
Simply, the core of this thesis is the be l i e f  that Burke and Oakeshott 
cannot be seen as the Alp h a  and Omega of conservatism. One is required 
to search for greater coherence. Crucially, the rejection of absolute
knowledge must not lead - if con s e r v a t i s m  is to be coherent - to the 
emergence instead of an absolute tradition. Man's reverence of 
tradition - or more a c curately the reverence of his traditions - should 
not require an arrest in his consciousness but stimulate its further 
development. The received view that c o n servatism is a disposition (and 
hence unique as a p o l i t i c a l  theory) must be rejected. Conserv a t i s m  is 
an ideology - it must see itself as such. M o v i n g  on, the rejection of 
absolutism, if con s e r v a t i s m  is to be coherent, should entail the need 
for a society where all ideas altercate in a 'free market' under the 
rule of law. In this way various traditions can, in a p l u r a l i s t i c  
society, join together and create a new fabric, a tradition which is 
d iverse and yet unified - a new allotropy.
The Sensual and the Dark rebel in vain,
Slaves by their own compulsion! In mad game 
They burst their manacles and wear the name 
of Freedom, graven on a heavier chain!
Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
France: An Ode
CHAPTER 1 
THE CONSERVATISM OF EDMUND BURKE.
Before an examination of Edmund B u r k e ’s p o l itical thought is 
attempted, it must be stated that his position as the frequently 
ac c laimed father of conserv a t i s m  is in some respects remarkable.
Burke was, for much of his life, p r i m a r i l y  a practical politician. 
Although this has not made his thought ephemeral, the fact that he was 
a Whig, and not a Tory, i n e v i t a b l y  causes initial confusion. Further 
peculi a r i t i e s  soon manifest themselves. Burke, despite being a 
member of parliament between 1760 and 1795, was never a comfortable 
establ i s h m e n t  figure (his Irish, middle class ancestry saw to that).
As a result Burke was excluded from holding high office; he only 
ever held the r e l a t i v e l y  minor position of Paymaster General, and then 
only for a short time. Far from being left with an image of a
complacent, p r i v i l e g e d  and contented person, we in fact see an angry -
often embittered - man who was on occasions dangerously outspoken.
However, it is not inappropriate to consider Burke one of the
founders of conservatism. Burke's thought, while largely a
reaction to specific questions of the day, can s t i l l  be viewed as a
coherent whole. It is the u n d e r l y i n g  current of his thought which
has been taken to- represent the c l a s s i c a l  c o n s e r v a t i v e  attitude. 
Moreover, in reacting to that c l i m a c t e r i c  event, the French revolution, 
Burke produced a theory that transcends time. A l t h o u g h  it was random 
chance which p l a c e d  Burke in that historic moment, it was his own s k i l l
that a l l o w e d  him to speak with enduring eloquence.
Burke's work can be u s e f u l l y  examined in rel a t i o n  to the debate 
he engaged in with the French rationalists; in his consideration of 
natural law and human rights; and f i n a l l y  in rela t i o n  to the general 
j u s tifications he offered for his theories.
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It is important to r e a lise at the outset p r e c i s e l y  what Burke 
is attacking when he attempts to refute the r a t i o n a l i s m  of the French 
rev o l u t i o n a r i e s .  If we assume that Burke is attacking reason per se, 
in the sense that we understand reason to constitute man's r e f l e c t i v e  
powers and mental judgement, he w i l l  be identified with the philosophic 
position of Hume. According to Hume men do not possess innate ideas 
and so e v e r y t h i n g  contained within the mind is m erely the result of 
sense-experience. Thus there is no kno w l e d g e  other than that d e r ived 
from sense-experiences. Further, for Hume, man does not even possess 
r e f l e c t i v e  k n o w l e d g e  gained from the examination of experience.
Rather, man possesses only a c o l l e c t i o n  of impressions which come via 
the senses (though the five windows of the soul, to use the phrase of 
St. Thomas Aquinas). Man's motivation, ergo, comes not from mental 
cognition (which given Hume's theory of k n o w l e d g e  is c l e a r l y
impossible) but from emotion. Thi3 is o b v i o u s l y  an extreme position, 
but it is one which rebuts the theories of the rationalists and 
therefore must be considered. No, Burke was not an empirical sceptic: 
rather, he shared the cla s s i c a l  view of Aristotle and, more 
particularly, Aquinas. The basis of knowledge is indeed experience, 
and the source of experience is found in the senses. However, while 
man is not t h o u g h t  to p o s s e s s  i n n a t e  k n o w l e d g e ,  he is c o n s i d e r e d  
capable of r e f l e c t i v e  reason. R e f l e c t i v e  reason, of course, is simply 
the examination of sense-experience. Nevertheless, one must note that 
r e f l e c t i v e  reason is always secondary and can never stand independent 
of sense-experience. This point w i l l  be further discussed later, but 
for now the connection between Aquinas and Burke must be emphasised. 
If we see Burke in the c l a s s i c a l  tradition much confusion will be 
avoided when we analyse his position on natural law and natural rights. 
Now we can examine the eighteenth century r e v o l u t i o n a r y  doctrine of 
human reason.
Burke's critique of reason is a c t u a l l y  a particular critique of 
in d i v i d u a l  and abstract reason. What he c h a l l e n g e d  was the 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  notion that man was capable of perceiving, without 
reference to tradition and the experience it contains, the best, indeed 
perfect, p o l i t i c a l  order. The r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  denied that tradition is 
one of the necessary sources of experience from which pol i t i c a l  
k nowledge is formed. A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  they postulated the quasi- 
scientific view that there existed perfect p o l itical forms (such as 
forms of democracy, go v e r n m e n t  and equality) which could be discovered 
by an uncorrupted reason. Given this doctrine, it is obvious that the
in d i v i d u a l  by h i m s e l f - - i f  he is not corrupted -- can gain access to the 
i n f a l l a b l e  covenant of true knowledge. The individual owes nothing to 
the genestic forces of society and its traditions, indeed he has to 
free h i m s e l f  from any social constraint to rely t o t a l l y  on reason. 
Thus, the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  doctrine of reason was both i n dividual and 
abstract: i n dividual as each person could independently acquire 
this knowledge; abstract as this mental process did not need 
traditional social guidance. Yet, in his opposition, Burke did not 
deny a role for reason - but reason had to be properly understood.
Right reason, for Burke, is a sort of communal reason which is 
reflected in society and its institutions throughout the ages. It is, 
then, a c o l l e c t i v e  reason and is to be considered an historical 
process. I n e v i t a b l y  this makes reason a concept which is beyond the 
total grasp of a mere individual. As Burke wrote when discussing the 
art of politics:
The science of government, being therefore so practical in itself, 
and intended for such practical purposes, is a matter which requires 
experience, and even more experience than any person can gain in his 
whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be. 1
I n dividual reason, that knowledge formed as a result of 
personal reflection, is connected to traditional experience. Descartes 
dictum 'Cogito, ergo sum' is erroneous: it should be replaced with 'we 
are, therefore we think'. This does not mean that re f l e c t i v e  
knowledge is e f f e c t i v e l y  emasculated: when traditional experience is 
examined it does not have to be s l a v i s h l y  reaffirmed in every detail. 
Man can analyse his tradition and propose certain changes; what he
cannot do, without f a l l i n g  into error, is fail to a c k n o w l e d g e  tradition
because it does not conform to his personal and abstract reflections.
To do so would be irrational as our c o mmunal k n o w ledge would be 
destroyed. It is in this sense that r e f l e c t i v e  reason is limited. As 
Burke observed:
The i n d i v i d u a l  is f o o l i s h ;  the m u l t i t u d e ,  for the m o m e n t ,  is 
f o o l i s h ,  w h e n  t h e y  act w i t h o u t  d e l i b e r a t i o n ;  but the s p e c i e s  is 
wise, and w h e n  t i m e  is g i v e n  to it, as a s p e c i e s  it a l w a y s  a cts 
r i g h t . 2
Burke insisted that far from acting with rational deliberation, 
the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  when they "abstracted" reason o b v iate proper reason 
and re l i e d  t o t a l l y  on man's in c o m p l e t e  r e f l e c t i v e  knowledge. As a 
result the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  made r e f l e c t i v e  reason a primary and 
independent entity - this at once i n v o l v e d  them in a logical 
impossibility, in Burke's c l a s s i c a l  view, and the void was f i l l e d  by 
human vices and passions (the ersatz r e p l a c e m e n t s  of traditional 
knowledge). In other words, in trying to break away from traditional 
experience the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  become m o t i v a t e d  by the dark side of 
man's nature and tradition - they were thrown back to brute anarchy.
So in a t t a c k i n g  the a b s t r a c t  r e a s o n  of the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s ,
Burke did not deny the existence of reason. As he stated:
I do not v i l i f y  theory and s p e c u l a t i o n  - no, because that would be
to v i l i f y  r e a s o n  i t s e l f .  No; w h e n e v e r  I s p e a k  a g a i n s t  t h e o r y ,  I
a l w a y s  mean a weak, erroneous, f a l l acious, unfounded, or imperfect 
theory; and one of the ways of d i s c o v e r i n g  that it is a false theory 
is by c o m p a r i n g  it w i t h  p r a c t i c e .  T h i s  is the t rue t o u c h s t o n e  of 
a l l  theories, which regard man and the affairs of men- does it suit 
his nature in g e n e r a l ? -  does it suit his nature as modified by his 
habits? 3
Speculation, for Burke, was not an independent absolute: it was
useful only when taken to be a component within the totality of 
knowledge. Again, in the above quotation, Burke denies that abstract 
reason is in fact rational. Instead, he sees the claims to abstract 
reason as being based on passion and egotistic will. According to 
Burke, without the suppression of egotistic will man was not capable 
of c i v i l i s e d  conduct. Thus the revolutionaries, far from creating 
perfect order, threatened to send man back to some form of brute 
nature. True or right reason r e a l l y  relates to man's very being, 
his intrinsic prejudice. Burke strongly argued this point in his 
Re flections :
You see, Sir, t hat in this e n l i g h t e n e d  age I am b o l d  e n o u g h  to 
c o n f e s s  that we are g e n e r a l l y  men of u n t a u g h t  f e e l i n g s ,  that, 
i n s t e a d  of c a s t i n g  a w a y  a l l  our o l d  p r e j u d i c e s ,  we c h e r i s h  them 
because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted and the 
more g e n e r a l l y  they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We 
are a f r a i d  to put men to l i v e  and t r a d e  e a c h  on his own p r i v a t e  
s t o c k  of r e a s o n ,  b e c a u s e  we s u s p e c t  that t his s t o c k  in each man is 
small, and that the i n d i v i d u a l s  would do better to avail th e m s e l v e s
to the general bank and capital of nations and of ages. 4
We must be very careful here to understand Burke correctly.
Prejudice did not mean for Burke a mindless bias. Rather, prejudice
is that disposition within man which leads him to value tradition and 
regard the experience it contains as precious. It is the acceptance by 
man of his place in an historical process. To put it another way: 
prejudice is the desire to use the capital in the bank of ages. To 
say that men are g e n e r a l l y  of untaught feelings, is to say that men are 
inclined to view this capital as being beneficial. In thinking that
the longer our prejudices have p r e v a i l e d  the more we cherish them, we
maintain that the tested p r inciples of c i v i l  conduct p r obably hold good 
due to their relevance, even in the face of changing circumstances. 
Ergo, our r e f l e c t i v e  reason should not be aimed at destroying the 
inherited gift of tradition, rather it should analyse what we feel from 
prejudice to be good: in this way r e f l e c t i v e  reason can identify those
factors which are most beneficial to our civilisation. Man is c a l l e d  
to sublimate his given nature, it is arrant idolatry to attempt the 
im possible and try to create an altogether new and independent 
nature. Burke's theory of reason is both dependent and deferent: 
dependent on the historical process and deferent in emphasising man's 
given, and limited, nature.
There is, then, a basic dichotomy between primary reason which is
the result of experience and tradition, and secondary reason,
which is human and reflective. The latter, Burke thought, is
weaker than the former: n e v e rtheless, both are opposite sides of the
same coin and cannot be separated without destroying the whole entity
we call reason. This view led Burke to refute a fundamental premise
held by Locke that man was, when born, a clean slate upon which
anything could be written. Burke saw man as the inheritor of a
c o m plex historical tradition which was to a great extent the
manifestation of human reason itself. Given this, man should realise
the h u mility of his situation and treat his environment with respectful
reverence. Yet Burke did not s imply support the status quo; society
must e v o l v e  and adapt to change, as he argued: "A state without the
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means of some change is without the means of its conservation."
Right reason, if applied, uses the experience found in tradition to
ensure that society e v o l v e s  c o herently - it invests the capital from 
the bank of the ages. Thus many broad social principles 
remain even if their a pplication alters as society adapts to meet 
new situations. Obviously, right reason has to be r e l i a b l e  if it 
is to e nable such development. We can infer, therefore, that 
Burke trusted right reason in so far as it could interpret the lessons 
of history, see their validity, and then apply and revise them in the 
future.
Burke made a vital distinction between s p e c u l a t i v e  reason and
practical reason. This bifurcation, found also in the thought of
A r i s totle and Aquinas, sees s p e c u l a t i v e  reason as not i n v o l v i n g  man's
free w ill but me r e l y  r e lating to the fixed physical order of the
universe. Practical reason, wh i l s t  operating within the given moral
order, does utilise man's free will, e s p e c i a l l y  when applied to
practical circumstances. P o l i t i c a l  reason, for Burke, ought to be
directed at p o l i t i c a l  action: thus it should be practical and not
speculative. As far as Burke was concerned: "Political problems do not
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p r i m arily concern truth or falsehood. They relate to good or evil." 
This is undoubtedly the language of Aquinas who argued that we can 
distinguish between ends and means. Roughly speaking, ends are 
s p e c u l a t i v e  and means practical. Now in the po l i t i c a l  sphere there 
are very few ends which f o l l o w  from natural law, but one of them is 
u n q u e s t i o n a b l y  the right to just government. However, despite the 
likes of Aquinas and Burke agreeing on this desirable end, there is a 
pr o b l e m  concerning the means to this end- simply, there may be a number 
of ways to achieve good government. To both Aquinas and Burke, none of
these differing means would be p r eferable in the absolute moral sense.
However, c e r t ainly for Burke, the precise choice of means depends on
the actual demands of a particular circumstance. For example, to say
that something is "true", in most aspects of politics, is meaningless
as situations w i l l  differ so much in time and place that a definite
"true" way to approach a problem w i l l  not exist. As this is the case,
the statesman should not be troubled with a goal in its abstract
perfection, but rather in its practical achievement. In reality this
may require certain compromises, but as Burke put it: "An
7
imperfect good is sti l l  a good." We can i l l u s t r a t e  this point by 
referring to the institution of monarchy. To ask whether monarchy is 
"true" is futile; one should ask- does monarchy work, that is, does it 
produce good gove r n m e n t ?  The answer is never l ikely to be u n i versal
because the institution of monarchy operates d i f f erently in various 
societies.
An i m p o r t a n t  c o m p a n i o n  to r e a s o n ,  in Burke's t h o u g h t ,  is
prudence. Principles, as pe r c e i v e d  by reason, are not enough to
dictate action in every case (as we distinguish between means and
ends). As Burke remarked: "The lines of mora l i t y  are not like the
ideal lines of mathematics. They are broad and deep as w ell as long.
They admit of exceptions; they demand modifications. These exceptions
and modifications are not made by the process of logic, but by the
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rules of prudence." What does this r e a l l y  mean? As adumbrated
above, Burke's conception' of human reason is a limited one. Burke 
admits that r e f l e c t i v e  reason is capable of p e rceiving certain ends 
(such as just government); however, just government cannot merely be
i mplemented in an ideal and abstract sense (as the revo l u t i o n a r i e s
thought). To c omplete our p o l i t i c a l  judgement, we must turn to
prudence: and prudence is another name for history and the experience
it contains. To' illustrate: someone may assert that the principle of
just government can only be secured in practice by an absolute
monarchy. Burke, in reply, would agree that our reason does indeed
p erceive the intrinsic virtue of just government, but the institution
of absolute monarchy is only a means to this end and can thus be
examined separately. And in examining the efficacy of
a bsolute monarchy in our own tradition, for example, we find the
excesses of James 11. Prudence, then, constitutes our practical
judgement founded c o m p l e t e l y  in past experience. Statesmen, as a
result, must seek to interpret thoroughly the situations they find
t h e m s e l v e s  in and ask whether certain actions are p r a c t i c a l l y
justified. As we have noted in this case, prudence offers a statesman
a r e l i a b l e  guide, for "the rules of prudence, which are formed upon the
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known march of the provid e n c e  of God" serve as e x c e l l e n t  indicators. 
This phrase reflects Burke's view that the state is ordained by God and 
that we can rely on His provid e n c e  so long as we are opon to it: that 
is, as long as we are prepared to humbly apply "right reason". As we 
have seen, history and tradition, for Burke, are components of 
reason; unlike many of his contemporaries he did not see tradition as a 
ne gative force keeping man in a condition of superstitious servitude.
So strong is this feeling in Burke, that some, such as Leo Strauss, 
h ave seen him as a forerunner of H e gelian historicism. This, however, 
o v e r - e m p h a s i s e s  the point: Burke did not see history progressing to an
absolute moment, as did Rousseau; and he did not regard tradition as a
supreme precedent in the legal sense. To have done so would have been
to view tradition as the whole of knowledge.
This brings us to a cardinal point of interpretation. Some
thinkers have argued that Burke revered tradition just because it was
old. Harold Laski stated that Burke was 'a utilitarian who was
co n v i n c e d  that what was old was v a l u a b l e  by the mere fact of its
10
a r r i v a l  at maturity." It is true that Burke's initial position was 
one of trusting tradition until the case for change had been proven. 
Burke's position was not that tradition is a b s o l u t e l y  good in the 
moral sense. History and tradition teach us good and bad lessons: if 
this were not the case Burke would have to approve of e v erything that 
is contained in historical experience.
It should also be noted that some have seen Burke's views on 
prudence as an elaborate excuse for crass pragmatism. Such an 
argument is answered aptly in Burke's own words, they also sum up his 
ideas about prudence very well:
I never govern myself, no rational man ever did govern himself, by
abstractions and universals. I do not put abstract ideas w h o l l y  out of 
any question; because I w e l l  know that under that name I should dismiss 
p r i n c i p l e s ,  and that w i t h o u t  the g u i d e  and l i g h t  of s ound, w e l l -  
understood principles, all reasoning in politics as in everything else, 
w o u l d  be o n l y  a c o n f u s e d  j u m b l e  of p a r t i c u l a r  f a c t s  and d e t a i l s ,  
without the means of drawing out any sort of theoretical or practical 
cone 1 usion....Circumstances are infinite, are i n f i n i t e l y  c o m b i n e d ,  are 
v a r i a b l e  and transient; he who does not take them into consideration is 
not erroneous, but stark mad; he is m e t a p h y s i c a l l y  mad. A statesman, 
never losing sight of principles, is to be guided by circumstances; and 
judging contrary to the exigencies of the moment, he may ruin his 
country forever. 11
We cannot see Burke as a r e l a t i v i s t  who held that no objective
p r inciples govern p o l i tical conduct. What Burke did say is that
such principles are very few, yet their modes of application very
many. Therefore, we must learn, via experience, the subtle naunces of
our own circumstance. On a s l i g h t l y  different tack, prudence, in
Burke's eyes, is necessary to give practical expression to higher
principles. This is important, for Burke definitely saw prudence
working within a given moral order; and the architect of this order is
God. Furthermore, man is rational in so far as he is able to perceive
this moral order. Indeed it is a part of his very nature to do so: it
was "the w i l l  of Him, who g a v e  us our n a t u r e ,  and in g i v i n g  i m p r e s s e d
12
as i n v a r i a b l e  Law upon it". This law is "that eternal law, in which
13
w i l l  and r e a s o n  are the same". If this w e r e  not the case, as the
sceptics argued, no rational society could be established:
Not c o n t e n t e d  w i t h  s h o w i n g ,  w h a t  is but too e v i d e n t ,  the 
n a r r o w n e s s  and i m b e c i l l i t y  of the h u m a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  t hey (the 
sceptics) have denied that it is all c a l c u l a t e d  for the discovery 
and c o m p r e h e n s i o n  of truth; or, w hat a m o u n t s  to the same, that no 
fixed order existed in the world, so corresponding to our ideas, as
to a f f o r d  the l e a s t  g r o u n d  for c e r t a i n t y  in any t h i n g  It is
e v i d e n t  that if s u c h  an o p i n i o n  s h o u l d  p r e v a i l ,  the p u r s u i t  of 
k n o w l e d g e ,  b o t h  in the d e s i g n  and the end, must be the g r e a t e s t  
folly....It is e v i d e n t  too, t hat m o r a l i t y  must s h a r e  the fate of 
k n o w l e d g e ,  and e v e r y  d uty of l i f e  b e c o m e  p r e c a r i o u s ,  if it be 
i m p o s s i b l e  for us to k n o w  that we are b o u n d  to any d u t i e s ,  or that 
the relations which give rise to them have any real existence. 14
A couple of points need to be e l aborated upon. First, Burke 
refutes the sceptics (and p a r t i c u l a r l y  Hume's) claim that sense- 
e xperience cannot give obj e c t i v e  k n o wledge of an external world. 
Secondly, and more importantly, Burke f o l l o w s  Aquinas in saying that 
our knowle d g e -  and it is knowledge despite the c a v i l s  of the sceptics-
is based in sense-experience, but man also has a definite nature. This
nature does not constitute- indeed cannot constitute-innate ideas, but
it does give man a spiritual telos. This telos, derived from God,
drives man to improve his being and attempt to achieve perfection.
This is done- b l u n t l y -  by doing good and avoiding evil. Man is born,
then, with the p o t e n t i a l i t y  of p e rceiving good and evil: this
potenti a l i t y  is r e alised in the judgements man makes in the world of 
*
sense-experience. Man's will, it follows, is to do good for this is 
his telos. Of course, man w i l l  not always do good, but when he does 
not he is acting i r r a t i o n a l l y  as he is demeaning hi3 being. Thus, as 
Burke remarks above, "will and reason are the same".
Burke regarded man as a religious animal who could
r a t i o n a l l y  perceive at least part of God's ordained order. As he
stated: "We know, and it is our pride to know, that man is by his
constitution a religious animal; that atheism is against not only
15
reason, but our instincts; and that it cannot p r e v a i l  long."
Remembering that atheism and scepticism go hand in hand, Burke 
manif e s t l y  aligns h i m s e l f  with the c l a s s i c a l  position of Aquinas: man 
has an intrinsic motiv a t i o n  to do good and is able to perceive good and 
evil; yet he must rely for practical judgement upon tradition as this 
represents his sense-data.
However, this inner light, which constitutes man's telos in Christian 
theology, is a seed not a citadel. It has to be nurtured within our 
social tradition. The revolutionaries are guilty of idolatry when 
they argue that this inner light allows man to step completely outside 
his tradition. It is possible to extinguish this light: in Dante's 
conception of Hell, for instance, the damned choose their lot as they 
no longer have the capability of desiring God.
Those who argue that Burke's notion of prudence is just a
subterfuge for practical utili t a r i a n i s m  are at a loss to explain away
his devotion to r e v e a l e d  religion (unless they smugly question the
sincerity of it). Burke time and time again referred to a higher
un i v e r s a l  order binding mankind. "All human laws" Burke wrote
"are properly speaking only declaratory; they alter the mode and
application, but have no power over the substance of original 
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justice." Prudence, we can see, does not give man a high sounding 
excuse to abrogate the moral order, merely a means to work e f f e c t i v e l y  
w i t h i n  it.
However, this moral framework does not provide man with precise 
answers to the practical prob l e m s  he faces. Its function is far more 
subtle than that, as Burke acknowledged:
There are some fundamental points in which nature never 
changes- but t h e y  are few and o b v i o u s ,  and b e l o n g  r a t h e r  to m o r a l s  
than to p o l i t i c s .  But so far as r e g a r d s  p o l i t i c a l  m a t t e r s ,  the 
h u m a n  m i n d  a n d  h u m a n  a f f a i r s  a r e  s u s c e p t i b l e  to i n f i n i t e  
modifications, and of combinations w h o l l y  new and unlooked for. 17
Burke argued, like Aquinas, that there are only a few ultimate 
p r inciples governing politics. One of them, as we have remarked, 
is just government. The d i fficulty lies not in p e rceiving this end, 
but in putting it into practice. It is in doing the latter that we
must pay so much attention to varying circumstances. Burke's critics 
have g e n e r a l l y  focused on the secondary element of his thought as it 
relates to law and politics. Certainly Burke, in this sphere,
emphasised the consideration of practical circumstances but he 
ack n o w l e d g e d  - indeed celeb r a t e d  - the fact that there was also a higher 
u n i v e r s a l  realm under which all poli t i c s  is conducted. To say there
may be many practical ways to approach a problem is not to say also
that the chosen means cannot then be judged by a moral criteria.
In fine, Burke saw the princi p l e s  of human reason, prudence, and a
higher moral order, a l l  working together like a mystical trinity (that
is: they are all different bodies of the same substance).
Natural law- the moral order- whilst existing, does not serve as a
c o venant to s o l v e  all the great and complex questions which manifest
t h e m s e l v e s  in the p r a c t i c a l  a f f a i r s  of man. Ergo, p r u d e n c e  i t s e l f
becomes a moral end: "God forbid" wrote Burke "that prudence, the
*
first of all the virtues, as w e l l  as the supreme director of them all,
18
should ever be empl o y e d  in the s e r v i c e  of vice." As a moral end,
despite this, it does not a l l o w  for the unlimited choice of means for
"There are ways and means, by which a good man would not even save the 
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commonwealth."
Ill
We can now examine the way in which Burke reacted to the 
eighteenth century doctrine of natural rights, p a r t i c u l a r l y  as 
expressed in France. We w i l l  see how Burke's spirited condemnation
of this theory did not contradict the o v e r a l l  structure of his 
p o l i t i c a l  philosophy. Indeed Burke never sought to refute the 
doctrine of natural law and true natural rights.
* In traditional Christian theology virtues are split into divine and 
human categories: the human virtues are prudence, justice, temperance 
and fortitude; the divine virtues, of course, are faith, hope and 
charity. Human virtues have to be practised to reflect the light of 
divine virtues. That Burke chooses to use this imagery further 
strengthens the case to consider him in the mainstream Christian 
tradition.
For Burke the French R e v o l u t i o n  m erely articulated an abstract
rights doctrine. It represented a kind of moral absolutism, and one 
created by human vice. 8y its nature, it did not acquiesce to a higher 
m orality and the rights and duties that would follow. Instead, it 
turned inward and argued that man has rights i n t r i n s i c a l l y  based in his 
nature. Thus, it was a truly secular view: man had the ability to 
p e r c e i v e  his own rights and did not need the assistance of tradition 
and the experience it contains. The theory was also uniform as the 
r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  thought that the rights perceived by an uncorrupted 
reason were akin to objective scientific discoveries. It is for this 
reason that Burke c a l l e d  the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  absolutists; they held that 
there did indeed exist perfect p o l i t i c a l  knowledge. Absolute 
principles, thought Burke, are very dangerous, for:
These metaphysical rights entering into common life, like rays of 
l i g h t  w h i c h  p i e r c e  into a d e n s e  m e d i u m ,  are by the l a w s  of n a t u r e  
r e f r a c t e d  f rom t h e i r  s t r a i g h t  line. Indeed, in the g r o s s  and 
comp l i c a t e d  mass of human passions and concerns the primitive rights 
of men undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections that it 
b e c o m e s  a b s u r d  to t a l k  of t h e m  as if they c o n t i n u e d  in the 
s i m p l i c i t y  of t h e i r  o r i g i n a l  d i r e c t i o n .  The n a t u r e  of man is 
i n t r i c a t e ;  the o b j e c t s  of s o c i e t y  are of the g r e a t e s t  p o s s i b l e  
c o m p l e x i t y ;  and, t h e r e f o r e ,  no s i m p l e  d i s p o s i t i o n  or d i r e c t i o n  of 
p o w e r  can be s u i t a b l e  e i t h e r  to man's n a t u r e  or to the q u a l i t y  of 
his a f f a i r s .  W h e n  I h ear the s i m p l i c i t y  of c o n t r i v a n c e  a i m e d  at 
and boasted of in any new p o l i t i c a l  constitutions, I am at no loss 
to decide that the artifices are grossly ignorant of their trade or 
t o t a l l y  negligent of their duty. 20
The French radicals, Burke maintained, promoted a contrived 
theory of reason which affected a dismi s s i v e  attitude towards the many 
c o m p l e x i t i e s  inherent in any society. Theirs was a sham reason.
More importantly, this error did not merely make the French radicals
21 .
impotent eccentrics for they argued that those who disagreed with their 
theories were blin d e d  by the corruption of the ancien regime. This 
gave them a p r o s e l y t i s i n g  zeal: it was considered m o r a l l y  permissable 
to c o e r c i v e l y  impose liberation on the u n e n l ightened and thus force 
them to be free. Burke thought that this destroyed the individual as 
an equal and s o v e reign being:
This sort of people are so taken up with their theories about the 
rights of man that they have t'Otally forgotten his nature. Without 
opening one new avenue to the understanding, many have succeeded in 
stopping up those that lead to the heart. They have perverted in 
t h e m s e l v e s ,  and in t h o s e  that a t t e n d  them, a l l  the w e l l - p l a c e d  
sympathies of the human heart. 21
It is essential to c l e a r l y  understand what Burke is attacking
here. He criticises the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  natural rights doctrine and the
natural law theory upon which it was based. For him it was not
founded on any permanent principles, and was therefore separated from
such r e b e l l i o n s  as the Glorious R e v o l u t i o n  of 1688 and the American
R e v o l u t i o n  of 1776. These r e v o l u t i o n s  had been based on principles
alre a d y  f u l l y  e l u c i d a t e d  by prudence. They were necessary, then, to
preserve the rights which were c l e a r l y  due to man, and proven by the
process of history. Remarking on the Glorious Revolution, Burke
said: "The R e v o l u t i o n  was made to preserve our ancient, indisputable
laws and liberties and that ancient constitution of government which is
2’2
our only security for law and liberty." Similarly, Burke saw the
American R e v o l u t i o n  as trying to establish the rights which were due to
the descendants of Englishmen. These rebellions, then, in no way sought
to deny historical experience; rather they reaffirmed it.
Thus Burke nev e r  attacked the whole body of natural law, just a
modern d e v e l o p m e n t  he regarded as spurious. This fact a l l o w s  us to 
r e c o n c i l e  what some have argued are contradictory positions on these 
revolutions. It also a l l o w s  us, when we examine the body of 
p r i n c i p l e s  which c o n s tituted the French R e v o l u t i o n ,  to 
f u l l y  understand Burke's criticism of eighteenth century radicalism.
One of the central precepts of the French R e v o l u t i o n  was the 
contract theory of government. It was held that man freely entered 
into a c i v i l  society, at least h y p o t h e t i c a l l y ,  and formed a contract to 
create a government. Thus, the basic p r i n c i p l e  of g o v e r n m e n t  is the 
legitimacy it r e c e i v e s  from the p eople via this notion of consent. If 
the peo p l e  o r i g i n a l l y  g ave legit i m a c y  to a government, they could also 
s u b s e q u e n t l y  revoke that legitimacy. So the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  argued 
that the p e o p l e  had a natural right to create and d i s s o l v e  g o v e r n m e n t s  
as they pleased. Burke did not think that society and g o v e r n m e n t  was 
at al l  voluntary, and he suspected that the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  would also 
deny this p r i n c i p l e  once they were e s t a b l i s h e d  in power. However, 
Burke did not c o m p l e t e l y  deny the theory of a societal contract. He 
remarked in his R e f l e c t i o n s  that:
Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts for objects of 
mere o c casional interest may be d i s s o l v e d  at p l e a s u r e -  but the state 
o u g h t  not to be c o n s i d e r e d  as n o t h i n g  b e t t e r  t h a n  a p a r t n e r s h i p  
agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico, or tobacco, or some 
other such low concern, to be taken up for a temporary interest, and to 
be d i s s o l v e d  by the f a n c i e s  of the p a r t i e s .  It is to be l o o k e d  u p o n  
w i t h  o t h e r  r e v e r e n c e ,  b e c a u s e  it is not a p a r t n e r s h i p  in t h i n g s  
s u b s e r v i e n t  o n l y  to the g r o s s  a n i m a l  e x i s t e n c e  of a t e m p o r a r y  and 
p e r i s h a b l e  nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership 
in a l l  art; a p a r t n e r s h i p  in e v e r y  virtue and in a l l  perfection. As 
the ends of such a p a r t nership cannot be obtained in many generations, 
it b e c o m e s  a p a r t n e r s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h o s e  who are l i v i n g ,  t h o s e  who are 
dea d ,  and t h o s e  who are to be born. 23
Burke argues here that one cannot question a contract without 
threatening c i v i l i s e d  society itself. The state is a complete 
partnership c overing al l  modes of human activity- if people seek to 
d i s s o l v e  the contract and start afresh, they put all that society 
stands for in jeopardy. Consequently, Burke thought that the 
only rational way to eradicate most shortcomings is by careful reform. 
Burke also denied, on moral and expedient grounds, that the people had 
a right to caprici o u s l y  annul the societal contract: no government 
c ou l d  function under such circumstances. The societal contract, in 
Burke's opinion, is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  between generations, between man 
and government, and between man and God. The state, in this 
contract, also has rights, p a r t i c u l a r l y  the right against capricious 
dissolution. Furthermore, the state is not established by man, but is 
d e v e l o p e d  as a part of God's cosmic contract with creation. So Burke 
denied the central p r i n ciple of ra d i c a l i s m  which held that a state's 
legitimacy was derived t o t a l l y  from the people. If men demand the 
sort of rights adv o c a t e d  by the revolutionaries, they subvert c i v i l i s e d  
society and their own true nature, as Burke argued: "By this
u npr i n c i p l e d  facility of changing the state as often, and as much, and
as in as many ways as there are floating fancies or fashions, the whole
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chain and continuity of the c o m m o n w e a l t h  would be broken. No one
generation would be like the other. Men would become l ittle
24
better than the flies of Summer."
Despite this, Burke did think that the people had an ultimate 
right to change the contract, but this right could only be justifiably 
exercised in extreme emergencies. The people would n a t u r a l l y  know
when such an emergency existed, as Burke put it: "What I have always
thought of the matter is this- that the most poor, illiterate, and
uninformed creatures upon earth are judges of a practical 
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oppression." In other words, the people would i n s t i n c t i v e l y  know when 
a government truly does breach the basic princ i p l e s  of natural justice. 
However, this situation did not exist in France: there the passions of 
the p eople were being w i ckedly manipulated.
As we have seen, Burke did not regard the state as a mere 
historical accident, not even one improved by the rationalising
process of history. No, the state is a divine gift; it is a moral
entity which a l l o w s  man his most high, free, and natural expression: 
that is, it helps him to l ive virtuously. On this point we can again 
turn to Burke's Reflections:
They c o n c e i v e  t h a t  He who g a v e  our n a t u r e  to be p e r f e c t e d  by our 
virtue w i l l e d  also the necessary means of its perfection: .He w i l l e d
the state- He w i l l e d  its connection with the source and original 
archetype of al l  perfection. 26
Again Burke f o l l o w s  h a p pily in the theoretical footsteps of 
Aquinas as he views the state as an essential part of the Divine Order. 
The s t a t e  a l l o w s  man to t r a n s c e n d  s o m e  of his own l i m i t a t i o n s  and 
progress to a higher virtue. The w i l l  to make this progression is a
God given characteristic and part of man's very nature. The state and
c i v i l  society, therefore, is man's natural environment; man is 
obl i g a t e d  to the state, as he is o b l igated to God, In Burke's 
thought, just as man is born into a family, so he is also born into a 
state; and just as parents have to be honoured, by God's command, so 
should the state be respectfully treated. Consequently, if
the state has any defects, men should approach them, and correct them,
with deep affection and reverence.
One can w e l l  appreciate why Burke so much detested the French
Revolution: it sought to bring down the ancien regime which, whilst
flawed in some ways, manifested many of the virtues necessary for a
truly c i v i l i s e d  society. Thus, thought Burke, the French by their
actions threatened their very c i v i l i s e d  existence. Part of their
f o l l y  stemmed from a b e l i e f  in a state of nature, from which man's
rights were extrapolated. However, Burke did not think that the state
of so c a l l e d  nature was at all natural as it was by definition
u n c i v i l i s e d  and, therefore, not condusive to promoting man's virtue.
Conversely, Burke thought that c i v i l  society was "a state of nature-
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and much more truly so than a savage and incoherent mode of life."
It was nonsense, then, to base human rights on such a condition. By 
arguing that c i v i l  society ought to honour the rights found in a state 
of nature, the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  were attempting to assert opposites.
For this reason, their p olicies could be nothing but ruinous for 
France. Despite this, Burke never rejected a concept of rights 
a l t o g e t h e r :
Far am I f rom d e n y i n g  in t h e o r y ,  f u l l  as far a w a y  in my h e a r t  from 
w i t h h o l d i n g  in practice (if it were of power to give or withhold) the 
r e a l  r i g h t s  of men. In d e n y i n g  t h e i r  f a l s e  c l a i m  of right, I do not 
m e a n  to i n j u r e  t h o s e  w h i c h  are r e a l ,  and are s u c h  as t h e i r  p r e t e n t e d  
r i g h t s  w o u l d  t o t a l l y  d e s t r o y .  If c i v i l  s o c i e t y  be m ade for the 
a d v a n t a g e  of man, a l l  the a d v a n t a g e s  for w h i c h  it is m a d e  b e c o m e  his 
right. 28
B u r k e  t h o u g h t  that men l e g i t i m a t e l y  had a r i g h t  to l i v e  u n d e r
the law; a r i g h t  to the f r u i t s  of t h e i r  own l a b o u r s ;  a r i g h t  to the
acquisitions of their parents; a right to provide for their children;
and g e n e r a l l y  a right to things which did not trespass on the rights of
others. He strenuously refuted the abstract rights claimed by the
r e v olutionaries, e s p e c i a l l y  those of equality, democracy and the right
to "cashier” governments. Burke, whilst denying p o l i t i c a l  equality,
did adhere, of course, to a be l i e f  in a moral e q u ality- an equality
under God. He chastised the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  for seeking to pervert
this principle in an attempt to embitter the common people. Happiness
and personal f u l f i l l m e n t ,  for most people, ought to be pursued through
a low l y  mode of life. The p r o b l e m  of p o l i t i c a l  participation was
t ackled by Burke in a similar way: the people did not have a specific
right to cashier their governors; yet they were enti t l e d  to good
gover n m e n t  in the p ublic interest. This again takes a religious
significance as Burke describes Christianity as: "a religion which so
much hates oppression, that when the God whom we adore appeared in
human form, he did not appear in a form of greatness and majesty, but
in sympathy with the lowest of the p e o ple- and thereby made it a firm
and ruling principle, that their welfare was the object of all 
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g overnment.” Good go v e r n m e n t  is an essential tenet of natural law, 
as r e v e a l e d  by God.
N evertheless, Go v e r n m e n t  has to pursue the real public interest
and not some ephemeral fancy. Sometimes this true interest w ill seem
contrary to the transient desires of the people. For this reason
Burke argued that "in this sense the restraints on men, as well as
30
their liberties, are to be reckoned among their rights." This may 
sound disti n c t l y  like forcing p eople to be free, but what Burke is
seeking here is a distinction between the higher aims of the state (in 
promoting man's eternal interest- his virtue) and the passing whims of 
the populace. The aristocracy as a class is best able to perform the 
function of good government as its interests are also the true 
interests of the state. Burke remarked: "A true natural aristocracy
is not a separate interest in the state, or separate from it. It is
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an essential integrant part of any large body rightly constituted."
Proper rule by the aristocracy did not mean rule by a p r i v i l e g e d  class,
as Burke asserts: "You do not imagine that I wish to confine power,
authority, and its distinctions to blood and names and titles. No,
Sir. There is no q u a l i f i c a t i o n  for government but virtue and wisdom,
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actual or presumptive." Not surprisingly, Burke was opposed to 
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  reform: given influence, the common people are l ikely
to use capricious passion as a means of guidance, as they lack 
possession of the proper virtues required for good government. This 
w ould i n e v i t a b l y  make any c i v i l i s e d  state moribund. France represented 
a country so threatened. The natural, that is true, interests of the 
French people were not promoted by the revolution, it was a contrived 
event stimu l a t e d  by wicked metaphysicians and ignorant politicians.
Thus it could not be classed as a genuine and j u s t ifiable reaction
to corrupt government.
The notion of a natural aristocracy led Burke to forsake any 
b e l i e f  in majority rule. Democracy, Burke argued, would not lead to
good government and would therefore be against natural law.
Moreover, Burke thought that the r e v o l u t i o n a r y  premise which justified 
democracy was utterly flawed. As we have noted, the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s
held that, to make any government legitimate, the people had to give
their consent to the original societal contract; and subsequently it 
was their right to r e g u l a r l y  hold their government to account. Burke 
argued, to the contrary, that until man lived in a c i v i l i s e d  condition 
no entity c a l l e d  the "people" could exist. Manifestly, as a result, 
claims to rights for the people based on this pre-social condition were 
spurious. If the people abolished the state, and with it society, 
Burke b e l i e v e d  that they would also abolish themselves. Such action 
was o b v i o u s l y  irrational.
In his opposition to the French R e v o l u t i o n  Burke is attacking a 
p a rticular type of natural law theory. Freedom, for Burke, was a
guiding principle, but it was a moral and qualified freedom. The 
French, in esta b l i s h i n g  an abstract "freedom" had not made the p eople 
g e n uinely free. As he remarked:
But what is liberty without wisdom and without virtue? It is the 
greatest of all poss i b l e  evils; for it is folly, vice, and madness, 
w i t h o u t  t u i t i o n  or r e s t r a i n t ....To m a k e  a g o v e r n m e n t  r e q u i r e s  no 
great prudence. Settle the seat of power, teach obedience, and the 
work is done. To give freedom is more easy. It is not necessary 
to gu i d e ;  it o n l y  r e q u i r e s  to let go the rein. But to f orm a free 
government, that is, to temper together those opposite elements of 
liberty and restraint in one consistent work, requires much thought, 
deep reflection, a sagacious, powerful, and combining mind. This I 
do not find in those who take the lead in the National Assembly. 33
The French in o v e r - e s t i m a t i n g  the c a pability of human reason had 
only succeeded in p e r v e r t i n g  it. Their theories merely e s t a b l i s h e d  a 
c o n t r i v e d  p o l i t i c a l  system, one which abrogated the moral constraints 
pl a c e d  on man. This author i t a t i v e  void, Burke the seer predicted,
would prob a b l y  be f i l l e d  by an emerging m i litary leader:
....But the m o m e n t  in w h i c h  that e v e n t  s h a l l  h a p p e n ,  the p e r s o n  
who r e a l l y  c o m m a n d s  the a rmy is y our m a s t e r -  the m a s t e r  of your 
King, the m a s t e r  of y our A s s e m b l y ,  the m a s t e r  of your w h o l e  
r e p u b l i c . 34
IV
We can now reflect on the transcendental nature of Burke's 
general p h i l o s o p h i c a l  position and expunge any lingering temptation 
to regard Burke as a pragmatic utilitarian. Burke is 
firmly in the c l a s s i c a l  school of Aquinas, and much of his criticism 
of eighteenth century r a dicalism is a direct result of this. Whilst 
admitting that we gain experience through the senses, and p o l i tical 
experience through tradition, Burke does see- like Aquinas- a place for 
r e f l e c t i v e  or human reason. N evertheless, this r e f l e c t i v e  reason is 
not independent from the rest of our experience; rather, it is an 
integral part of that whole we c all reason. It is by cutting off human 
reason from the rest of our communal reason, and thus making it 
absolute and sovereign, that the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  commit the cardinal 
error which makes their theories moribund. Essentially, for Burke, 
man's r e f l e c t i v e  powers enable him to work e f f e c t i v e l y  within 
tradition; and the tradition Burke was talking of is the Christian 
tradition of Europe. In this tradition, the state is ordained by God 
for the promotion of man's virtue. Here are Burke's transcendental 
roots: he could not accept the utterly secular notion that man's 
r e f l e c t i v e  reason made him t o t a l l y  independent and able to perceive his 
nature and rights in relation to nothing but himself. Burke saw man as 
dependent on God and on tradition.
If man was independent and sovereign, it was i n e v i t a b l e  that the 
r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  would also see the state, as man's creation, as 
independent and sovereign. This was anathema to Burke: the state was
within the moral order ordained by God. Thus it was manife s t l y  limited 
and subservient. Because the state is w i l l e d  by God, its primary 
justification owed nothing d irectly to man. However, the state does 
not take on a supra-human role which a l l o w s  it to subjugate the people 
totally. Whilst it is true that the state is owed, as a moral 
obligation, a l l e giance, it is also true that the people are permitted- 
even required -to oppose e v i l  government. As Burke states, the people 
are competent judges of oppression. Furthermore, if the state ceases 
to manifest the moral order to which it is bound, it ceases to be 
c i v i l i s e d  and the peo p l e  are released from any obliga t i o n  they had to 
i t .
It is o b v i o u s  t h a t  the s t a t e  c a n n o t  p a s s  any l a w  it 
pleases. Speaking about the Popery laws, which deprived Irish 
cat h o l i c s  of the rights enjoyed by protestants, Burke argued: "They 
h ave no right to make a law prejudicial to the whole
communi ty....because it would be against the pri n c i p l e  of a superior
law, which is not in the power of any community, or the whole race of 
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man, to alter." Burke reiterated his criticism of the notion that a 
commonw e a l t h  can create law as it pleases:
It would be hard to point out any error more s u b v e r s i v e  of all the 
order and beauty, of a l l  the peace and happiness, of human society 
than the p o s i t i o n  that any b o d y  of men h a v e  a r i g h t  to m a k e  what 
laws they please; or that laws can derive any authority from their 
institution mer e l y  and independent of the subject matter. 36
Later, in the same passage, Burke argued that such an e vil
creed, as advocated most n o t ably by Hobbes, is not only unworthy of a 
philosopher, but of an i l l i t e r a t e  peasant as well. Burke's most famous 
and eloquent references to natural law come in his attacks on Warren 
Hastings, a former g o vernor of India. The idea that the laws of 
morality, in their primary form, were not universal was p a r t i c u l a r l y  
repugnant to Burke:
This gentleman (Hastings) has formed a geographical morality, by 
which the duties of men in pu b l i c  and private situations are not to 
be governed by their relation to the great Governor of the universe, 
but by c l i m a t e s .  A f t e r  you h a v e  c r o s s e d  the e q u i n o x a l  line, a l l  
the v i r t u e s  die.... A g a i n s t  this g e o g r a p h i c a l  m o r a l i t y  I do
protest, and declare therefore, that Mr Hastings s h all not screen
h i m s e l f  u n d e r  it, because....the l a w s  of m o r a l i t y  are the s ame 
e v e r y w h e r e ;  and a c t i o n s  that are s t a m p e d  w i t h  the c h a r a c t e r  of 
peculation, extortion, oppression, and barbarity in England, are so 
in Asia, and the wor l d  over. 37
B u r k e  c a n n o t  be seen, in my o p i n i o n ,  as a u t i l i t a r i a n  who d e n i e d  the
r u l e s  of m o r a l i t y .  C o n f u s i o n  a r i s e s  from Burke's p r e c i s e
interpretation of true natural law theory-- p a r t i c u l a r l y  as this stands
out in stark contrast to the more common eighteenth century doctrine of
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  natural rights and the peculiar notion of natural law
which went with it. In this respect, Burke returns to a cla s s i c a l
view of natural law and leads the i n t e l l e c t u a l  r e v o l t  against the "age
of reason". For Burke the appearance or mode of application of natural
law may change, but not the main body of primary principles. It was
this fact that gave natural law its dynamism and efficacy-it was not a
p u r e l y  static phenomenon, as it was for the French revolutionaries.
N ev e r t h e l e s s ,  the basic tenets of natural law are u n i v e r s a l  and
c onstitute the guiding force in the legal traditions the wor l d  over.
Thus, the likes of Hastings could not escape the sanction of law:
Mr H a s t i n g s  has no r e f u g e -  let him run f rom l a w  to law; let him 
fly from common law; and the sacred institutions of the country in 
which he was born; let him fly from acts of par 1 iament....sti 1 1 the 
M o hammedan law condemns him...let him fly where he w i l l -  from law to 
law-,law thank God, meets him e v e r y w h e r e -  a r b i t r a r y  p o w e r  c a n n o t  
s e c u r e  him a g a i n s t  law; and I w o u l d  as s o o n  h a v e  t r i e d  him on the 
K oran, or any o t h e r  e a s t e r n  c o d e  of laws, as on the c o m m o n  l a w  of 
this kingdom. 38
It is with Burke's theories on the nature of man's reason, the 
character of natural rights, and the essence of society and the state, 
that a coherent c o n s e r v a t i s m  starts to emerge. Burke was the most 
conspicuous critic of the age of reason. He thought the notion of 
absolute knowledge, which e s t a blished reason as an omnipotent 
sovereign, was repugnant. Instead Burke emphasised the importance of 
tradition and reiterated the inherent limitations on man's nature. He 
attacked the French r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  for their contrived human rights 
doctrine and a l t e r n a t i v e l y  argued for a c l a s s i c a l  interpretation of 
natural law. The state, thought Burke, was a divine institution which 
a l l o w e d  man to sub l i m a t e  his basic nature and thus aspire to 
c i v i l i s a t i o n  and greater virtue. The state does not m erely exist fixed 
in one time and in one place: rather it links past, future and present 
generations. F inally, for Burke reverence and reform were appropriate
to p o l i t i c a l  conduct; r e v u l s i o n  and r e v o l u t i o n  were certainly not.
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The old laws of England - they
Whose reverend heads with age are gray,
Children of a wiser day,
And whose solemn voice 
Thine own echo - Liberty!
P.B. Shelley
The Mask of Anarchy
CHAPTER 11 
BURKE CRITICALLY EXAMINED
According to Burke, both tradition and r e f l e c t i v e  reason are 
prop e r l y  seen as sources of knowledge: thus they can be regarded as
opposite sides of the same coin we c a l l  'knowledge1 or 'reason'. They 
cannot be parted, therefore, without destroying the whole. Some 
thinkers have taken exception to this e p i s t e m o 1 o g y , arguing that it 
relegates man, via his deference to tradition, to a supersticious 
servitude. However, it must be stated that for man to be 
subjugated so t o t a l l y  to tradition he would have to see tradition as 
the whole of knowledge. This was not B u r k e ’s theoretical position, as 
we have seen in the pre v i o u s  chapter.
Ne v e r t h e l e s s ,  two questions arise out of Burke's theory on the 
duality of knowledge. First, should tradition be given any position 
at all in the f ormulation of knowledge? Secondly, is Burke justified 
Burke realised that it was this b e l i e f  (rather than the general sham 
b e l i e f  in the r a t i o n a l i t y  of the whole of mankind) which represented 
the r e a l l y  insidious threat to society. The radicals a c k nowledged that
society, in holding the people in a corrupted servitude, conditioned 
human behaviour. The comparison here with Plato is obvious. Plato 
argued that the society he lived in was corrupt and had decayed from 
a previous ideal condition. He therefore argued that man had to go 
back to the original state of nature to perceive true ideal forms 
(perfect knowledge). This ideal society, then, is quite independent 
from contemporary society for a corrupt entity can never give one 
k n o w ledge of an ideal form. However, Plato held that only the elite 
were capable of attaining such knowledge. The French r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s  
agreed with this; and they also thought, like Plato, that an enormous 
emphasis must be p l a c e d  on the subsequent establishment of a virtuous 
society (for it is only the virtuous society that can properly educate 
the masses). Thus societal forces are v i t a l l y  important. Tradition 
becomes a r e l i a b l e  source of knowledge after the e s t a blishment of the 
ideal state.
Burke recognised the moral and p o l i t i c a l  a b s o l u t i s m  inherent in 
this radical theory. In turning to tradition, Burke not only became 
a realist (as he refuted the Platonic theory of ideal forms) but he 
a lso emphasised the limitations in man's nature: man could not be seen 
as a quasi-d i v i n e  being. The second question is more difficult: does 
Burke strike an appropriate balance between traditional and r e f l e c t i v e  
kn o w l e d g e ?  If a theory err's too much towards tradition it is likely 
to become static and devoid of significant human input; a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  
an undue reliance on r e flection is l ikely to lead to an abstract and 
a b solute theory. Burke, in my view, can be j u s t ifiably criticised for 
o ver emphasising tradition; this led to a sometimes
unsatisfactory practical appl i c a t i o n  of his thought, e s p e c i a l l y  in 
matters r e lating to the economy and to the role of the state.
In emphasising tradition, Burke manif e s t l y  pla c e d  great 
importance on the lessons we learn from historical experience. Now 
we must face the cardinal difficulty: for are these lessons uniformly 
percei v e d ?  Burke c l e a r l y  thought that this was the case. However, 
what if someone interprets tradition differently? Burke's response 
was that this w i l l  not happen if right reason is applied. In other 
words, right reason is itself absolute. This seems to me to be 
d a n g e r o u s l y  close to the r ationalist f a l l a c y  he so stro n g l y  refutes. 
O b v i o u s l y  there is no room for p l u r a l i s m  in this definition of right 
reason. I think that Burke adopted this abstract position because he 
viewed the British constitution as being close to perfection. 
Consequently, r e f l e c t i v e  reason had only to perceive the obvious.
It is in this context that conservatism, and the c o n s e r v a t i s m  of Burke 
in particular, has been criticised for being facile, s e l f  satisfied and 
static - interested me r e l y  in the preserv a t i o n  of the status quo.
In my opinion the greatest d i f f i c u l t y  is that Burke's position 
keeps human input to a minimum and the very creative consciousness of 
man is in danger of being arrested. The logical result of this is 
for c o n s e r v a t i s m  to become a disposition and not a reasoned theory.
11
Perhaps the most ‘interesting and critical interpretation of 
Burke's thought in recent times comes from C.B. Macpherson. This 
attack centres on the economic consequences of Burke's thought.
M a c p h e r s o n  cl a i m s  that we can see Burke as a bourgeois liberal
capitalist. He remarks: "There is no doubt that in e v e r y t h i n g  he
wrote and did, he venerated the tradi t i o n a l  order. But his
t raditional order was a l r eady a c a p i t a l i s t  order. He saw that it was
1
so, and wished it to be more freely so." We saw, in the p r e v i o u s
chapter, the rights which Burke thought due to ind i v i d u a l s ;  and there
is no doubt that these rights are, to use the modern idiom, n e g a t i v e  as
opposed to positive. For instance, Burke argued that there is a moral
e q u a l i t y  under God which binds mankind; thus the i n d i v i d u a l  is to be
respected. However, when we come to a notion such as an i n d i v i d u a l s
labour, this right has scant p r a c t i c a l  v a l u e  as Burke argues that:
"Labour is a commodity like e v e r y  other, and rises or f a l l s  according
2
to the demand. This is the nature of things."
This "nature of things" is the general economic theory of Adam 
Smith. The economy, it is maintained, is g o v e r n e d  by natural laws 
and if these laws are interfered with, d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  and disaster 
follows. Thus Burke argued that it is the duty of governments:
 m a n i f e s t l y  to resist the very first idea, s p e c u l a t i v e  or
p r a c t i c a l ,  t hat it i3 w i t h i n  the c o m p e t e n c e  of g o v e r n m e n t ,  t a k e n  as 
government, or even of the rich, as rich, to s u p p l y  to the poor, those 
n ecessaries which it has p l e a s e d  the D i v i n e  P r o v i d e n c e  for a whi l e  to 
w i t h - h o l d  from them. We, the people, ought to be sensible, that it is 
not in breaking the laws of commerce, which are the laws of nature, and 
c o n s e q u e n t l y  the l a w s  of God, t h a t  we are to p l a c e  our h o p e  of 
softening the D i v i n e  d i s p l e a s u r e  to r e m o v e  any c a l a m i t y  under which we 
suffer, or which hangs o ver us. 3
B u r k e ,  then, a r g u e d  t h a t  no g o v e r n m e n t  s h o u l d  aim to a m e n d  the 
n a t u r a l  l a w s  of c o m m e r c e .  But a g o v e r n m e n t  can try to f a c i l i t a t e  the 
s m o o t h  f u n c t i o n i n g  of t h e s e  laws. It can h e l p  to e s t a b l i s h  the
optimum economic environment. As Burke wrote:
Let g o v e r n m e n t  p r o t e c t  and e n c o u r a g e  industry, secure property, 
repress violence, and discountenance fraud, it is a l l  that they have 
to do. In o t h e r  r e s p e c t s ,  the l e s s  t hey m e d d l e  in t h e s e  a f f a i r s  
the better; the rest is jn the hands of our Master and theirs. 4
Such a view, which asserts the impotence of government to 
b e n e f i c i a l l y  alter the given economic order, seems very harsh to us 
today. After all, experience has shown us that there are 
many ways of re g u l a t i n g  the economy in an effort to increase 
prosperity. Nevert h e l e s s ,  the view Burke adhered to was becoming 
orthodox in the late eighteenth century and must be judged in such a 
light. T h e oretically, Burke is consistant in his views on the 
economy and on the character of human nature: he chooses to emphasise 
the concept of limitation. Radical action was not required because, 
just as Burke thought the constitution was ordained and nearly 
perfect, a definite 'natural1 economic e nvironment existed. Man 
should only ensure that things are kept in trim by occasional, careful 
reform. To be fair, we must also note that Burke thought that it was 
only through the expansion of the economy (via the a c cumulation of 
capital) that the poor would become m a t e r i a l l y  better off. So Burke 
could s t i l l  c l a i m  that the welfare of the poor is paramount in his 
p o l i t i c a l  and economic thought. He may have been in error- it is my 
firm b e l i e f  that he was- but his error may have been sincere.
Macpherson does not grant Burke such licence. For him, Burke 
was a pragmatist who would utilise any theoretical device to secure 
more safely the bourgeois order. This is a matter of interpretation, 
but we must remark that the industrial r e v o l u t i o n  which was beginning 
to grip Britain by the end of Burke's life was s t i l l  w e l l  short of the
v i o l e n c e  and e x p l o i t a t i o n  it exhibited in the nineteenth century. 
Interestingly, the Romantic poets, who revered Burke, were 
p a s s i o n a t e l y  opposed to the inhumane excesses of industrialism.
Burke, I think, was g e n u i n e l y  concerned about the welfare of the poor; 
what is u n d o ubtedly the case, however, is that his conception of 
economic right is t o t a l l y  one-dimensiona 1. Moreover, and perhaps more 
damaging, Burke's b e l i e f  in d i v i n e l y  created economic laws in e v i t a b l y  
strengthenes the criticism that he placed an inordinate emphasis on 
tradition and the rece i v e d  order.
This minim a l i s t  economic theory does not compliment Burke's 
lofty, if undevel o p e d ,  notions about the function of the state. We 
have observed that Burke regarded the role of the state in human 
d e v e l o p m e n t  as cardinal: the state exists to promote human virtue.
This position seems to imply an active role for the state : for 
instance, Burke argued that it was the duty of the state to sometimes 
constrain i n d i v i d u a l s  (indeed, the individual is ent i t l e d  to such 
constraint by right). Nevert h e l e s s ,  when we view the state in economic 
terms its role is m e r e l y  that of a night watchman; it does not promote 
virtue in any way other than by p r o v iding a specific legal structure 
for commercial transactions. Yet many would surely argue that without 
material security few human virtues can be nurtured. Ergo, this 
dichotomy in the role of the state is not only contradictory, it may 
w e l l  be m u t u a l l y  negating. It is certainly a dichotomy that has 
haunted conservatism to this day.
A related objection is Burke's assertion that the indivi d u a l  is 
enti t l e d  to the fruit of his own labour. This notion is found in the
thought of Locke; and like Locke, Burke applied this theory very weakly
For how do we determine what is a just return for labour?
To fall back, as Burke does, upon what the free market is prepared to 
give at a p a rticular time implies that i n d i v i d u a l s  are e n t i t l e d  to a 
return which may fluctuate mercurially. Surely this obviates any 
practical value attached to such a principle?
F inally, we can question whether the free market advocated by 
Burke had been prescribed by tradition. It would be convenient, 
afterall, if we could excuse some of Burke's more austere economic 
theories as being s o l e l y  the result of restricted experience. Alas, 
this bears little examination: in fact the British economy prior to
the industrial r e v o l u t i o n  had been dominated by m e d i e v a l  guilds, state 
i n t e r v e n t i o n  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  in the granting of monopolies), and even by 
such notions as just prices. Again we can accuse Burke of commiting 
the sin he found so d amnable in the rationalists: he promu l g a t e s  an 
abstraction. Consequently, Burke becomes an absolutist in his 
economic theorising: intervention, per se, is bad and
counterproductive. Not surprisingly, Burke lost his usual eye for 
the nuance of practical circumstances. Indeed, in the f o l l o w i n g  
passage Burke seems to realise this:
 in the c a s e  of the f a r m e r  and the l a b o u r e r ,  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s
are a lways the same, and it is a b s o l u t e l y  impossible that their free 
contracts can be onerous to either party. It is in the interest of 
the farmer, that the work s hould be done with effect and celerity: 
and that cannot be, u nless the labourer is w ell fed, and otherwise 
f o u n d  w i t h  s u c h  n e c e s s a r i e s  of a n i m a l  life, a c c o r d i n g  to his 
habitudes, as may keep the body in full force, and keep the mind gay 
and cheerful. 5
Such sentiments, regrettably, do not permeate the whole of 
Burke's economic thought. Instead, he often turns to a contrived 
free-market laissez faire theory which argues that the state 
cannot in any way help to secure the material sustenance of the p o p u l a c e  
by interfering with the fixed laws of commerce.
Ill
In his v i t r i o l i c  attack against the rationalists, Burke f a l l s  
back upon a basic Hobbesian assumption by arguing that society and 
g o v e r n m e n t  cannot be separated. Hobbes argued that the destruction 
of govern m e n t  resu l t e d  also in the destruction of society because 
without g o vernment man is thrown back into the pre-social condition of 
babaric nature. Burke i m p l i c i t l y  accepted this theory by accusing 
the rationa l i s t s  of jeopordising a l l  that society stands for by 
c a p r i c i o u s l y  questioning the authority of government. Thus, the 
g o v e r n m e n t a l  contract, for Burke, is one of u n i v e r s a l  importance as it 
represents the defence of c i v i l i s a t i o n  itself. Given that the stakes 
are so high when the authority of the state is challenged, it is not 
surprising that both Burke and Hobbes adopted a c o n s e r v a t i v e  
presumption in favour of the legitimacy of government.
Of course, Locke had already c h a l l e n g e d  this theory before the 
r a t i o n a l i s t s  came on the scene. Locke held that the concepts of 
go v e r n m e n t  and society cou l d  be separated. Therefore, a government 
could be c h a l l e n g e d  without endangering the benefits inherent in social 
existence. According to Locke, the state of nature is pre-government, 
but not pre-social. Ergo, man enjoys a social existence from the dawn
of human time. Consequently, in c h a l l e n g i n g  the authority of a 
government, and in attempting to change the constitution of the state, 
man's social character sti l l  remains intact. As a result, the stakes 
inherent in r e b e l l i o n  are far less absolute. In turn, man's 
attitude towards the state becomes less deferential and more 
inquisitive and demanding. Clearly, in siding with Hobbes, Burke 
again emphasised the constraints placed upon man: the role of
tradition, in a nega t i v e  sense, is once more strengthened. However, 
the Lockean view opens up altogether different possibilities. For 
example, it can be argued that the entity of a 'people' can be tied to 
man's basic social nature and not, as Burke insists, to the 
institution of government. It would then be a very s m a l l  step to 
justify some of the democratic rights e m p h a t i c a l l y  denied by Burke.
We can further examine, in this light, the role Burke gave to 
the state. To recapitulate, he argued that the state is a divine 
creation. It owes nothing to man as he can never aspire to any 
c i v i l i s e d  conduct whilst sti l l  in the presocial state of nature. This 
denied man any real c r eative input, and Burke's theory of the state was 
in this sense a static and c o n s e r v a t i v e  one. Now, if we accept the 
Lockean premise that man is already in a social condition before the 
institution of government, the human role in the d e v e l o p m e n t  of the 
state is i n e v i t a b l y  increased. I do not suggest for a moment that man 
s uddenly creates a govern m e n t  whilst s t i l l  in a state of nature.
This would require prior knowledge of the state, and this is c l e a r l y  
impossible. So in a sense the state does e v o l v e  spontaneously; but it 
does not e v o l v e  in a vacuum, independent of human requirements. Here
lies the rub, as we w i l l  see below, for it is to meet human 
requirements that the state exists: and man, the social animal, is well
able to recognise his requirements. In denying such creative licence, 
Burke's theories lack a v a l u a b l e  existential character and are 
therefore o n e - d i m e n t i o n a 1. Again we see the error Burke so easily 
f a l l s  into: by stressing the limitations in man's power of r e f l e c t i v e  
reasoning, he accorded too dominant a position to tradition. For 
this reason, Burke saw the state d e v e l o p i n g  through a d i v i n e l y  inspired 
e v o l u t i o n a r y  process.
Sir Karl Popper has emphasised the danger which f o l l o w s  from 
such a lack of human input in the theory of the state. Simply, if the 
state is given such a qua s i - d i v i n e  role in s u p e rvising human affairs 
society can slip a l l  too quickly towards totalitarianism. Popper 
sees Burke f a l l i n g  into the historicist trap by asking questions such 
as 'What is the state?', 'How did it o r i g i n a t e ? ' ,  and 'What is its true 
nature?'. Rather, for Popper, we should ask o u r s e l v e s  'What do we 
demand from the state?'. This is a very pratical question, and one 
which requires the crea t i v e  powers of mankind to be put to good use. 
Burke, in seeing the state as above ephemeral matters and concerned 
instead with the promotion of virtue, gave the state a p o t e n t i a l l y  
a l l - e m b r a c i n g  and mystical role. And here lies the danger of 
totalitarianism: for virtue becomes an absolute p r i n ciple to which
other conerns must be subservient. Here we may remember with a shudder 
that it is sometimes the i n d i v i d u a l s  right, according to Burke, to be 
restrained.
It has been o b s e r v e d  that the concept of domocracy had no 
posi t i v e  place in Burke's thought. Like Plato, Burke did not think 
that democracy and anarchy were distinguishable. Moreover, democracy 
is i n c ompatible with virtue as it v u l g a r i s e s  the true function of the 
state. Consequently, Burke saw no active role in the state for the 
bulk of the p o p u l a t i o n  (save, in the ultimate emergency, the ability to 
r e c o g n i s e  and o v e r t h r o w  tyr a n n y ) .  Rather, virtue for most people 
rests in humbly realising their l o w l y  position in society (another idea 
f o u n d  in P l a to). Ergo, t h e r e  is v e r y  l i t t l e  r o o m  for the m o r a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  of the p e ople once this doubtful, but static and 
absolute, interpretation has been giv e n  to virtue. So, not only did 
Burke see a limited role for man in the affairs of the state, but he 
also denied that most men had this strictly limited role to play.
In thi3 context, Burke agreed with Plato that a g o vernment is only ever 
threatened by a split amongst its leaders. It was not the peasants 
who t h r e a t e n e d  the a n c i e n  r e g i m e  in F r a n c e ,  but t h e i r  r a t i o n a l i s t  
masters .
Burke's theory of the state is e f f e c t i v e l y  static. Of 
course, the state does, very gradually, d e v e l o p  and change - 
otherwise it would be unable to c o nserve itself. But, Burke argued, 
this e v o l u t i o n  is d i v i n e l y  inspired and devoid of primary human input. 
By limiting participation within the state to a very s m a l l  elite, 
Burke's theory does not a l l o w  for the peaceful re m o v a l  of an unjust 
g o v e r n m e n t  (assuming that the eli t e  is united in its support for such a 
corrupt administration). As the pe o p l e  have no right of censure via 
periodic elections, o nly v i o l e n t  means, in an ultimate emergency,
remain open. C l e a r l y  Burke did not think that the elite would in
fact be corrupted. This presumption in favour of the elite was based
upon a b e l i e f  that the interests of the natural aristocracy (the
elite) were the same as the true interests of the state. A natural
aristocracy, for Burke, is made-up by i n d i v i d u a l s  of outstanding merit
and virtue: therefore, he was a timocrat. However, some have argued
against this b e n e v o l e n t  conception of aristocracy. Paine, for
instance, remarked in his usual endearing style: "But the origin of
aristocracy was worse than foppery. It was robbery. The first
aristocrats in a l l  countries were al l  brigands. Those of latter 
6
times, sycophants." No doubt many w i l l  agree with Paine that it is 
the lust for power and w ealth which motivates the elite to rule, and 
not the l o v e  of the true interest of the state. Our central 
objection, n e v e r theless, must be that B u r k e ’s theory is a closed one: 
if we see the interests of the aristocracy and the interests of the 
state as being the same, then surely abuses of a most a p p a l l i n g  nature 
can be justified, as they were in p r e - r e v o l u t i o n a r y  France?
IV
Burke is a n e gative p o l i t i c a l  theorist. This is i l l u s t r a t e d  in 
his great work 'Reflections on the R e v o l u t i o n  in France' in which he 
attempted to refute the ideas of the radicals. Here Burke is at his 
best in h i g h l i g h t i n g  the dangers inherent in any r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
doctrine. N e v e rtheless, Burke's thought did not proceed to the
maturity which requires not only a stern, but w h o l l y  legitimate, 
criticism of one's opponents, but which also offers a positive
justification for the proposed alternative. Instead, Burke succumbs 
too readily to the omnipotent and omnipresent p ri n ci pl e of tradition. 
In e vi ta b ly  the c r e at i ve  powers of man's i n t e l l e c t  are understated in 
Burke's p o l i ti c al  thought. It is in this respect that Burke's thought 
lacks balance; and it is for this reason that Burke's influence on the 
d e v e l o p m e n t  of c o n s e r v a t i v e  thought has to be considered deeply 
a m b i v a l e n t .
U n do u bt ed l y Burke's greatest contribution to c on s e r v a t i v e  
thought - which is s t i l l  of pre-eminent importance today - comes in 
his warning of the dangers present w h en ev er  a s e lf - d e c l a r e d  
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  el it e c la im s to have access to perfect po li t ic al  
knowledge. With enormous force, Burke made e x pl ic it  the rejection of 
any notion of abstract, abs ol ute  kn o wl e dg e-  and this remains the 
t heoretical seed-bed of conservatism. However, Burke has to be 
criticised for a d v o c at i ng  an unwarranted reliance on traditional 
conduct which itself, embodied in the British Constitution, is made the 
object of ab so l ut e  reverence. Worse still, the position Burke reserved 
for the aristocracy, who he considered the n a t u r a l l y  prescribed 
defenders of the British tradition, makes him an in tr actable elitist.
It is h ar dl y surprising that many, for this reason, have dismissed 
Burke as an e s t a b l i sh m en t apologist. There is cert ai nl y an air of 
c o m p l ac e nc y and s e l f - s a t is f ac ti o n in Burke's thought and this can only 
serve to cast doubt on his de cl ar e d concern for the whole nation and 
al l  of its people. Nowhere is this more apparent than in his view of 
the state and its economic role in particular.
It is crass to use hindsight in a facile way to condemn a
p o l i t i c a l  theorist without reference to his historical situation.
Despite this mitigation, it has to be a c kn ow le dg ed  that Burke's view of
the state both sustained a p o l i ti ca l  e st a bl is hm en t in a p r i v i l e g e d
*
position and a l l o w e d  for the emergence of unrestrained capitalism. For 
Burke the state is p r i n c i p a l l y  concerned with promoting man's virtue, 
the s a l v a t i o n  of his soul; i n e v i t a b l y  immaterial concepts, such as a
moral e q ua li ty  under God, are held to be the basic considerations of
the state. A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  the importance of man's d aily bread, the 
sustenance of his body, is thought to be a matter for the heavens 
where the laws of commerce are legislated. Perhaps this ought to be 
the central objection: the view that po verty is d i v i n e l y  prescribed and
outside the power of man to al le vi at e . Another danger of concentrating 
in po li t ic s on the immaterial is that an i ns e ns it iv it y in govern me nt  
w i l l  develop. C e r ta i nl y  it w i l l  not see go ve rn m en t as being concerned 
with satisfying, as far as is practicable, the needs of man; and 
we should not forget Popper's warning that the immaterial, and almost 
by definition myst ic al  and unmeasurable, can lead to brazen arrogance 
and even totalitarianism. A reluct anc e to embrace economic questions, 
perhaps u n d e r st a nd ab l e in Burke's time, has left a deep and 
c on straining imprint on much of c o n s e r v a t i v e  thought. This has to be a 
matter of grave concern for it a l l o w s  critics to argue that
*It is unfair, in my opinion, to criticise Burke for defending a system
of economic laissez-faire which made much of the populace destitute.
The full consequences of this new orthodoxy were not yet apparent in 
Burke's time. However, he is part of an intellectual trend which 
allowed lai3sez-faire to emerge, despite the fact that - in Burke's 
case - it had not been prescribed by tradition.
c o n s e r v a t i s m  is e x c l u s i v e  and interested not with man body and soul but 
with a restricting dichotomy which in practice, if not in e xp li ci t 
theory, works to the benefit of those who have been able to achieve 
economic security.
Finally, it must be noted that Burke found the concept of 
democratic govern me nt  repugnant. If judgement should again not be too 
harsh, given Burke's own times, it is s t i ll  true that this aspect of 
his thought fits nea tl y into a coherent whole which also revered 
tradition, e ul og is ed  aristocracy, and exuded economic pessimism. 
U lt i ma te ly , whilst as a person Burke was ino rd in at el y generous, his 
concern for the plight of the i n d i vi d ua l was as ineffectual as it was 
sincere. In this respect Burke's thought did not encourage the 
d e v e l o p m e n t  of the modern state. Democracy, p ubl ic  w e lf ar e and 
go ve rn me n t i nt er ve n ti on  were all  dismissed as dangerous pipe-dreams. 
Ne ve rt h el es s , Burke c e r ta in l y s ho ul d not be regarded as c o m p l e t e l y  
obsolete. While many of the p ractical a p pl ic at io ns  of his thought are 
u tt er ly  inappropriate to a liberal democracy, Burke's refutation of 
abstract r at io na l is m  remains a theoretical triumph.
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Because these wings are no longer wings to fly 
But m ere ly  vans to beat the air
T.S. Eliot 
Ash-Wednesday
CHAPTER 111 
THE CONSERVATISM OF MICHAEL OAKESHOTT
P h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ,  Oakeshott is an idea li st  in the tradition of
Hegel, R.G. C ol li ng w oo d , and F.H. Bradley. Idealism here represents
the attempt at e x p l ai n in g experience in a coherent and c om pr eh en si ve
way: it is, therefore, holistic. As B r adl ey  stated, such thinking is
an effort "to comprehend the u n iv er se  not simply piecemeal or by
1
fragments but somehow as a whole". In Oakeshott's words, "Experience
stands for the concrete w hole which anal ys is  di vides into
'experiencing' and 'what is experienced'. Experiencing and what is
experienced are, taken separately, m ea n in g le ss  abstractions; they
2
cannnot, in fact, be separated." It f o l l o w s  that a unity exists
between the subject and the object of perception; and inherent in this
view is that e xperience i n v o l v e s  thought or judgement. As Oakeshott
states: "thought or judgement, as I see it, is not one form of
3
experience, but is it s el f the concrete w hole of experience." Some
have, it sho ul d be noted, divided experience into thought and 
sensation. Here, thought is indirect experience; and sensation is 
direct, immediate expe ri en ce - that is, experience without the
interference of reflection. For Oakeshott this position is untenable 
as it requires a bare 'this is' without name or character; sensation
4
would have to "be isolated, simple, e x c l u s i v e  and w h o l l y  unrelated".
Now it is true, Oakeshott argues, that we are used to speaking of the
sensation 'yellow'; however, in experience 'yellow' is never immediate
and u nr e la te d to p re vi ou s  experience. Y e l l o w  is a general concept,
one which we recognise and differentiate from other experiences; and
this o b v i o u s l y  requires thought. Moreover, experience even in its
simplest form n ec essitates consciousness, and "to be conscious of
something is, in some degree, to recognize it; and recognition i n v o l v e s
5
us at once in judgement, in inference, in reflection, in thought."
Ergo, thought or judgement is not one form of experience but the
concrete whole of experience. As experience is thought or judgement,
experience can be seen as a world of ideas.
Truth, for Oakeshott, must be taken as i ns e pa ra bl e from
experience: "Truth is the condition of the wo rl d of experience in which
6
that world is sa ti sf ac to ry  to itself". G iven this, truth cannot be seen 
as abstract, as f a l l i n g  somehow outside experience; it is not an 
external, independent criteria with which experience can be verified.
We h a v e  a l r e a d y  o b s e r v e d  that  e x p e r i e n c e  is a w o r l d  of ideas, 
and Oakeshott emphasi se s that from the first moments of consciousness 
this world is gi ve n as a whole. Thus what is giv en  in experience is a 
w o r l d  of ideas, and w h e r e v e r  t h e r e  is a s y s t e m  or a w o r l d  t h er e  is 
unity. If this were not the case, then the giv en  in experience would
become immediate: that is, it would be i n he re nt ly  i so lated and without 
relation to anything else in experience. As Oakeshott states:
The g iv en  and the isolated, so far from being synonymous, are 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y :  to be g i v e n  m e a n s  to be, to that e x t e n t ,
recognized and understood, w hile the isolated, as such, is what 
is u n r e c o g n i z a b l e ,  m e a n i n g l e s s  a n d  i n c a p a b l e  o f b e i n g  
u n d e r s t o o d .  The m a n i f o l d ,  the u n i q u e ,  the n o n s e n s i c a l ,
whatever else they are, are not what is given in experience. We 
b eg in , then, w i t h  a w o r l d  of ideas; the g i v e n  is n e i t h e r  a 
c o l l e c t i o n ,  nor a s e r i e s  of ideas, but a c o m p l e x ,  s i g n i f i c a n t  
whole. Behind this there is nothing at all. 7
The given in experience is never solid and fixed; a lt e r n a t i v e l y ,
the gi ve n in experience is giv en  to be transformed. Ergo, our
in cl i na ti o n towards what is given in experience must be posi ti ve  and
critical. The achieved, which is the transformation of what is given,
is a world which is d if fe rentiated from the given w orld by being more
of a world. In Oakeshott's words: "And in experience a g iv e n world of
ideas is raised a bove its gi ve n condition by endowing it with a greater
degree of unity. In experience we begin, consequently, with the
negation of the presented unity whe rev er  that is seen to be false or 
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inadequate." It seems to me that this point is cardinal to
Oakeshott's p o l i t i c a l  thought: for, in experience, "we never look away
from a given wo rl d to another world, but always at a gi ve n world to
9
di sc ov e r the unity it implies." Consequently, the giv en  world and the
ac hi e ve d world are not separate as "what is ach ie ve d is the given
endowed with a greater degree of unity, at no time are they separate or 
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e v e n distinct." We never, therefore, in the transformation of the 
given in experience attempt to a ch ie ve  an abstract, fixed and 
determined world of ideas; indeed, such a world, if it is to be outside 
what we have defined as experience, w ould have to be g e nu in el y
immediate, and this is impossible.
Knowledge, in Oakeshott's philosophy, is w h atever we find in
experience that we are o b lig ed  to accept, "whatever in experience we
11
are led to find satisfaction in." Knowledge, therefore, is not the 
transformation into experience of something that is not experience, it 
is not the transformation of 'things' into 'ideas'. Further, as 
kn ow le dg e exists within experience we cannot view progress in knowle dg e 
as a process of accretion. To quote Oakeshott:
To speak of 'adding to knowledge' is misleading. For a gain 
in knowle dg e is alwa ys  the transformation and the recreation of 
an entire world of ideas. It is the creation of a new wor ld  by 
t r a n s f o r m i n g  a g i v e n  wor 1 d.... K n o w  1 e d g e , in the v i e w  I h a v e  
s u g g e s t e d ,  is not the e x t e n s i o n  of a m er e  s e r i e s ,  or the 
e nl ar ge m en t of a mere c o l l e c t i o n  of ideas; it is the achi ev em en t 
of the c o h e r e n c e  of a g i v e n  w o r l d  or s y s t e m  of i d e a s by the 
pursuit of the imp li ca ti on s of that world. 12
The age old d if f ic ul t y of whether truth can be known is
obviated, if one accepts Oakeshott's reasoning. Ear li er  we obs er ve d
that wha te ve r is satisfactory in experience is true: moreover, it is
true because it is satisfactory. Furthermore, o nly what is true can be
f u l l y  known. For Oakeshott "Truth is a c o r r e l a t i v e  of experience.
Without experience there can be no truth; without truth there can be no 
13
experience."
Some ph il os o ph e rs  argued that a g u l f  exists between 
re al i ty  and experience: to Oakeshott this is absurd and he e m p h a t i c a l l y  
asserts that reality is experience. If this were not the case, if 
experience and r ea li ty  were in fact separate, then reality wou ld  become 
u nk n ow ab l e as it would fall outside experience. Again, if this happens
and re al it y is separated from knowledge, then reality becomes an empty
concept. Thus, states Oakeshott: "Reality is experience, not because
it is made real by being known, but because it cannot without
14
c ontradiction be separated from knowledge." If reality is unknowable,
and therefore kn ow le dg e impossible, we are committed to an absurd
logical error, for: "To assert the i mp o ss ib il it y of knowl ed ge  is always
15
to assert a piece of knowledge, and is therefore s e 1 f-condradictory."
We cannot, then, separate reality and experience: and as experience is
a world of ideas, re al it y is also a world of ideas. Yet, Oakeshott
does not assert that re al it y is either a world of mere mental events,
or a wo rld of mere ideas. Oakeshott argues that: "Certainly my
experience is alway s mine, is a lwa ys  my p sychical state, but it does
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not f o l l o w  that it is mer el y mine." Indeed, if this were not so we
would have to accept e very experience at its face value: to question or
to doubt would be impossible. When we doubt or question, manifestly, 
we appeal not to our mere experience, but to our experience as a world, 
to the coherence of our experience. This leads us to the f ol l o w i n g  
conclusion:
In e x p e r i e nc e. . .. t he re  is a l w a y s  a r e f e r e n c e  b e y o n d  w h a t is 
m e r e l y  t ru e to w hat  is r e a l ,  b e c a u s e  w h at  is m e r e l y  t r u e -  a 
c o h e r e n t  w o r l d  of m e re  i d e a s - i s ,  in the end, n e i t h e r  c o m p l e t e  
nor absolute, but an abstraction. Rea li ty  is a coherent w orld 
of concrete ideas, that is of things. Consequently, it is one, 
a s i n g l e  s y s t e m ,  and it is r e a l  o n l y  as a w h o l e .  My v i e w  is, 
then, that rea li ty  and experience are inseparable; that reality 
is e x p e r i e n c e ,  a w o r l d  of i d e a s  and  t h e r e f o r e  not a w o r l d  of 
mere ideas; that re ality is experience....; that reality is what 
is s a t i s f a c t o r y  in e x p e r i e n c e ;  a n d  t h a t  r e a l i t y  is, 
conseque nt ly , a coherent wo rld  of concrete ideas. 17
Thus, "reality is not w hat ev er  I happen to think; it is what I 
18
am o b lig ed  to think."
We can conclude, then, that re ality is given in every
experience; but this is not to say that in every experience reality is
gi ve n equally. Therefore, the question we are left with is "Where is
19
the experience in which r ea lity is given fully?" If reality is not
gi ve n e x p l i c i t l y  as a whole in experience, there occurs what Oakeshott
c a l l s  an "arrest" in experience. "Each arrest- Oakeshott states- is a
determinate world of ideas, distinguished from ev er y other world of ideas
20
in respect of the precise assertion of r ea lity it embodies." We must
note that each arrest, or mode, of experience is not a d is t in ct - le v e 1
of experience; indeed, modes of experience have no independence from
the t ot al it y of experience. However, the t otality of experience is
not made up of its modifications. As Oakeshott remarks: "For what is
g en u in e ly  abstract is not a part of the whole, it does not contribute
to the w ho l en es s of the whole, and c e rt ain ly  it is not prior to the
whole; it is the wh ol e as a whole f al l in g short of its full 
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character." Or more directly: "A mode of experience is defective,
not because it has ceased to be experience or has abandoned the proper
criterion of experience, but because it no longer attempts to satisfy
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that criterion in full." The specific modes of experience which 
Oakeshott examines are the historical, the scientific, and the
p ractical modes. We.can first look at the world of practical
e x p e r i e n c e .
Practical experience is the most common mode of experience.
Indeed, its ubiquity meahs that we must make a conscious effort just to 
step outside it. Many p eop le  never manage this, and for them 
practical experience represents the concrete whole of experience: but
such a perception represents a dangerous error. In its general 
character, practice embodies ev er yt hi ng  which bel on gs  to the normal 
conduct of life as such. Specifi ca ll y,  practice represents our 
attempt to alter existence or to maintain it u na l te re d in the face of 
change. Thus, Oakeshott observes, even the s e em ing ly  impractical 
re li gi ou s mystics are a c t u a l l y  practical persons, as they do attempt to 
alter existence. Practice, then, is activity; and it is the activity 
which is i ns e pa ra bl e from the conduct of life. This requires a 
d e s i r e ,  a "to be", and a " th at  is": if we w ant  c h a n g e  we w an t  s o m e t h i n g  
"to be" which is different from the present "that is". However, and 
this is an important point, we cannot in the abs ol ut e sense separate 
the "to be" from the "that is": for this to happen, our desired change,
the "to be", wou ld  have to be external from the world of experience, 
independent f ro m the "t ha t is".
The scientific and h istorical modes of experience are not as
important to our inquiry. Briefly, science is a world conce iv ed  under
the category of quantity, and is therefore, a b s o l u t e l y  co mm un ic ab le
experience. Here, the function of an hypothesis is to make this world
of scientific experience more of a w or ld - and so a ch ieve greater unity.
Thus, Oakeshott maintains: "....no scientific ge ne ra l iz at i on  is
c o nc e iv ed  to be beyond the p os si b il it y  of revision; it is experimental
in the sense that so soon as it is seen to stand in the way of a
coherent world of scientific experience it ceases to be held 
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important."
History cannot be seen as a mere exhumation of past events: for 
no such ob je ct i ve  and independent w orld can exist divo rc ed  from our
experience. Rather, "The historian's business is not to discover, to
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recapture, or even to interpret; it is to create and to construct." As
we h ave seen, if history were in fact independent and awaiting mere
discovery, it would not be experience and would therefore be
unknowable. For the histor ic al past to be k nowable it has to belong
to the present w orld of experience. So Oakeshott concludes: "What
r e a l l y  happened (a fixed and finished course of events, immune from
change) as the end in history must, if history is to be rescued from
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nonentity, be r ep la ce d by 'what the evidence obl ig es  us to believe".
We must now return to our e ar lier question "Where is the 
experience in which r ea lity is gi ve n fully?" Each mode of experience, 
Oakeshott contends, is r ea li ty  from a pa rt ic u la r standpoint or arrest; 
but in p h il os o ph y  we are concerned only with the t ot ality of experience 
without r es e rv at io n or arrest. Thus the answer to our quest is to be 
found in philosophy. However, Oakeshott now becomes f un d a m e n t a l l y  
sceptical, for such a pursuit as is ent ai le d in p hi lo so ph y is the 
st ri v in g for perhaps u n a tt a in ab l e perfection. We can end this section 
with Oakeshott's c o n c lu d in g  paragraph in "Experience And Its Modes":
We c ome  b a c k  in the end, then, to w ha t was s u g g e s t e d  at the 
beginning: the view of p h i l o s o p h i c a l  thought as the pursuit, for
its own sake, of an unlimited, unmodified experience, and at the 
s a m e  time as a mood, a t urn of mind. T h e r e  is p e r h a p s  
s o m e t h i n g  d e c a d e n t ,  s o m e t h i n g  e v e n  d e p r a v e d ,  in an a t t e m p t  to 
a c h i e v e  a c o m p l e t e l y  c o h e r e n t  w o r l d  of e x p e r i e n c e ;  for s u c h  a 
p u r s u i t  r e q u i r e s  us to r e n o u n c e  for the t ime b e i n g  e v e r y t h i n g  
which can be c a l l e d  good or evil, ev er ything which can be v al u ed  
or rejected as val ue le ss . And no matter how far we go with it, 
we sha ll  not ea s il y  forget the sweet delight which lies in the 
empty kisses of abstraction. Indeed, the attempt to find what 
is c o m p l e t e l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  in e x p e r i e n c e  is so d i f f i c u l t  and 
dubious an undertaking, leading us so far aside from the ways of 
o r d i n a r y  t h o u g h t ,  that t h o s e  may be p a r d o n e d  who p r e f e r  the
e m b r a c e s  of a b s t r a c t i o n .  For, if t h e s e  g i v e  but l i t t l e  
satisfaction, and give that l it tl e not for long, it is at least 
a ta ngible and certain satisfaction while it lasts and one not 
to be despised. 26
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We can now move onto Oakeshott's conception of rationalism, the 
kernel of his p o l i t i c a l  thought. Oakeshott begins by e m p h a t i c a l l y  
refuting the r ec ei ve d view that rational conduct requires the 
pr emeditation of ends, together with the furnishing of logical 
j us tifications for these ends and the means to their achievement. As 
Oakeshott describes such activity:
In order that a man's conduct shou ld  be w h o l l y  'rational', he 
m u s t  be s u p p o s e d  to h a v e  the p o w e r  of f ir s t i m a g i n i n g  and 
choosing a purpose to pursue, of defining that purpose c l e a r l y  
and of s e l ec t in g  fit means to ac hi ev e it; and this power must be
w h o l l y  i n d e p e n d e n t ,  n o t  o n l y  of t r a d i t i o n  a n d  of t h e
u n c o n t r o l l e d  relics of his fortuitous experience of the world, 
but also of the a ct ivi ty  i tse lf  to which it is a preliminary. 27
The mind, in such a theory, is gi ve n this power by an intrinsic 
ch ar ac ter is ti c c a l l e d  'reason'; and it is this power to reason which 
makes the mind a distinct and independent enity. Distinct and 
independent, of course, from the e xperiences which are contained within 
the mind in the form of knowledge. Thus, if such a conception is
valid, the mind can sit in judgement o ver the experiences which are
c o n s ta n tl y  paraded before it. According to Oakeshott, such a mind is 
a total fiction. Experience does not m er el y enter the mind, but 
e xperience also forms the mind. As Oakeshott states:
Mind as we know it is the offspring of kn ow le dg e and activity; 
it is c o m p o s e d  e n t i r e l y  of t h o u g h t s .  You do not fir st  h a v e  a 
m i n d ,  w h i c h  a c q u i r e s  a f i l l i n g  of i d e a s  a n d  t h e n  m a k e s  
distinctions between true and false, right and wrong, reasonable 
and u n r e a s o n a b l e ,  and then, as a t h i r d  step, c a u s e s  a c t i v i t y .  
P r o p e r l y  s p e a k i n g  the m in d  has no e x i s t e n c e  a p a r t  from, or in 
a d v a n c e  of, t h e s e  and o t h e r  d i s t i n c t i o n s .  T h e s e  and o t h e r  
distinctions are not acquisitions; they are c o ns ti tu ti ve  of the 
mind. Extinguish in a man's mind these and other distinctions, 
and w hat  is e x t i n g u i s h e d  is not m e r e l y  a man's ' k n o w l e d g e '  (or 
p a r t  of it), but the m in d i t s e l f .  W h at  is l e ft  is not a 
n e u t r a l ,  u n p r e j u d i c e d  i n s t r u m e n t ,  a p u r e  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  but 
nothing at all. 28
It is e q u a l l y  f a l l a c i o u s  to assume that conduct can spring from
any a cti vit y which presupposes a distinct and independent mind. In
actuality, all so c a l l e d  independent premeditation is mer el y an
abstraction from p re v io us  knowledge. For example, a scientific
di sc ov er y  cannot be w h o l l y  spontaneous and separate from previous
scientific activity. The most b r i l l i a n t  scientist becomes an impotent
eccentric if he is cut off from the flow of past scientific experience.
Thus, no scientist can p re con ce iv e an hypothesis and then test it; for
to form an hypothesis, and to test it, requires in the first place
prior scientific knowledge. Therefore, rational conduct cannot be
seen as action which u t il i se s  independent premeditation, rather:
"Rational conduct is acting in such a way that the coherence of the
world of a ct iv it y to which the conduct be lon gs  is p re se rv ed  and 
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p os si b ly  enhanced." The rational scientist, then, works within 
scientific tradition when attempting to ad vance scientific knowledge.
Of course, this view l o u d l y  reiterates Oakeshott's p h i lo s op h ic al  
position: scientific a ct iv it y  is concerned with making the scientific
wo rl d view more coherent. Ad vances in scientific knowl ed ge  (and we
must a ck nowledge that scientific 'discoveries' can be re vo lu ti on ar y)  
perform this very function: they take the given in scientific
experience and transform it into a world with greater unity and added 
coherence. Whils t throughout, we must remember, the gi ve n and the 
transformed in scientific, or any other, experience are never separate, 
distinct or independent.
To i l l u s t r a t e  the absurdity of so c a l l e d  'rational' conduct 
Oakeshott cites the e xa mp l e of the design of bloo me rs  in Britain in the 
1880's. It was contended that b lo om er s were the rational answer to 
the p r ob le m  of what w ou ld  be pr actical for a lady to wear when riding a 
bicycle. The designers, then, were concerned only with this question, 
independent of al l  other i r r e l e v a n t  factors. But if this was so, asks 
Oakeshott, why did they not come up with the sol ut io n of shorts? The 
reason is that the designers of b l oo me rs  were not in fact seeking to 
s o l v e  the pro bl em  of what was the best clo th in g for a lady to wear when
riding a bicycle, but what was the most practical mode of dress which
was s ti l l a cc ep ta bl e in nineteenth century Britian. Thus, as an 
ex am pl e of independent and premeditated conduct, the design of blo om er s 
is m an if es tl y deficient.
Ra ti on al is ts --  to use their s e l f - s t y l e d  misnomer-- proceed to 
another fundamental error. Al l human a c tiv it y requires knowledge, and 
Oakeshott asserts that k no wl edg e is of two sorts: technical and 
practical. However, the r at i on ali st  fails to recognise this 
bifurcation, and here lies his ult im at e downfall. Technical kn owledge
is a part of all prac ti ca l activity; it consists of r e f l e c t i v e
principles, maxims, di re ct io ns --  in short, it is the type of knowledge
which can be f ormulated into rules. Thus, technical k n ow led ge  can be 
taught and learned. An exa mpl e of technical knowledge, in one form of 
human activity, is a cookery book. We can consult such a source to 
find out the 'what to do' of cooking. Due to its character, technical 
kn ow le d ge  can project the i l l u s i o n  of certainty for it is precise and 
c l e a r l y  formulated. A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  practical knowl ed ge  appears to 
lack formu la ti on  and precision; it is thus often criticised and 
dismissed as not being kn ow l ed ge  at all. Yet this misses the point, 
argues Oakeshott. W h il st  it is true that practical k n owl ed ge  (or 
t ra di ti on al  kn ow le dg e as it is sometimes called) cannot be formulated 
into rul es  and is not re fl ec tiv e,  it is s t il l  an essential part of 
human activity. P ractical kn ow le d ge  r e a l l y  has to be 'caught' as 
opposed to 'taught'. Taking the e x am pl e of cooking, one may be able 
to t e l l  s o m e o n e ,  t e c h n i c a l l y ,  'what to do', but not 'how to do it'. The 
latter can o nly be imparted and acquired, as it is in the master- 
a p p r e n t i c e  re 1 ationship, for instance.
The f a l l a c y  of r a t io na l is m lies in the fact that it takes 
technical k no wl ed ge  to be the t ot al it y of knowledge, when in fact it is 
o nl y a part of the w hole (indeed, p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ,  it is an abstraction 
or an arrest in the whole). This c om pl et e r eliance on technical 
k n o w le d ge  means, for Oakeshott, that the essence of r a ti on a li s m is a 
combination of p erfection and uniformity. R a ti on al is ts  have no p lace 
for the 'best in the circumstances', rather they strive for the 
de fin itiv e- - and for them, p e r c e i v a b l e - -  'best'. As the rat io na li st s 
do not recognise the exigences of differing c i r c u m s t an c es —  which they 
see m e r e ly  as excuses for inaction-- they have no p lace for variety,
and so their theories become uniform. To quote the a r ch -r a ti on al is t
Godwin: "There must be in the nature of things one best form of
g o v er n me nt  which al l  in te llects, s u f f i ci e nt l y roused from the sl um be r
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of savage ignorance, w il l  be i rr es is ta bl y incited to approve." Of 
course, r at io na l is t s do not argue that there is one u n i ve r sa l remedy 
for al l p o l i t i c a l  ills; however, once the remedy for one p a rt ic ul ar  ill 
has been p er c ei ve d by reason, it is u n i ve r sa l in its application. 
Anything else, for them, wou ld be irrational.
The comparison here with Burke's view of reason is most 
pronounced. Like Oakeshott, Burke denies that reason can conquer
most of man's i l l s  if only it is freed from the st if fl in g constraints 
of a corrupt society. Moreover, much of Burke's criticism of 
E n l i gh t en me n t r a ti o n a l i s m  centres on the fact that he regards such 
theories of reason as h o p e l e s s l y  abstract and p ur el y s p e c u l a t i v e  (thus 
lacking any grounding in human nature). This is e xa ctly Oakeshott's 
point: rational conduct is absurd because it does not conform to the 
actual nature of human a c t i vi t y- - again, taken separately, it is 
h o p e l e s s l y  abstract. Oakeshott, again like Burke, turns to tradition 
for a more s at isfactory re gu la to r of human activity; but unlike Burke,
I w i ll  argue, Oakeshott de ri ves  his justifications for tradition from 
pu r el y se cular arguments. Before an examination of Oakeshott's 
conception of tradition is undertaken, however, it is as w e ll  
to look at the pl ac e he accords to id eology in his thought.
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As we h ave seen, the r at ion al is t becomes intoxicated on the
certainty and s im p li ct y  of technical knowledge. Furthermore, thi3
infatuation with technical kn owledge leads the ra ti onalist to seek for 
some a l l - i n c l u s i v e  'crib' to direct his p ol i t i c a l  activity. The 
rationalist needs an ideology. Oakeshott prov id es us with the 
f ol l o w i n g  definition of ideology:
As I u n d e r s t a n d  it, a p o l i t i c a l  i d e o l o g y  p u r p o r t s  to be an 
abstract principle, or set of related abstract principles, which 
has been i nd e pe nd e nt l y premeditated. It supp li es  in advance of 
the a c t i v i t y  of a t t e n d i n g  to the a r r a n g e m e n t s  of a s o c i e t y  a 
f o r m u l a t e d  end to be p u r s u e d ,  and in so d o i n g  it p r o v i d e s  a 
means of distin gu is hi ng between those desires which ought to be 
encouraged and those which ought to be suppressed or redirected. 
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Cl early, for Oakeshott, such thinking represents the rationalist 
f a l l a c y  r ev isi ted (or in p o li t i c a l  form). To refute this f al la c y 
Oakeshott maintains that practice is always prior to doctrine. Anyone 
who argues that one can acquire by i n t e l l e c t u a l  premeditation a set of 
independent p r in ci p le s  to regulate p o l i ti ca l  conduct is committing the 
most disastrous ignoratio elenchi. As Oakeshott puts it:
So far from a p ol i t i c a l  ideology being the qua si -d iv in e parent 
of p o l i t i c a l  activity, it turns out to be its ea rthly stepchild. 
I n s t e a d  of an i n d e p e n d e n t l y  p r e m e d i t a t e d  s c h e m e  of e n ds  to be 
p u r s u e d ,  it is a s y s t e m  of i d e a s  a b s t r a c t e d  f rom  the m a n n e r  in 
w h i c h  p e o p l e  h a v e  b e e n  a c c u s t o m e d  to go a b o u t  the b u s i n e s s  of 
attending to the arrangements of their societies. The pedigree 
of eve ry  p o l i t i c a l  ideology shows it to be the creature, not of 
p r e m e d i t a t i o n  in a d v a n c e  of p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y ,  b u t  of 
m e d i t a t i o n  u p o n  a m a n n e r  of p o l i t i c s .  In s ho rt , p o l i t i c a l  
a c ti v it y comes first and a p o li t i c a l  ideology f o l l ow s  after; 
and the unde rs ta nd in g of p oli ti cs  we are inve st ig at in g has the 
d i sa d va nt a ge  of being, in the strict sense, preposterous. 32
So i d e o l og i ca l conduct-- like its rational twin-- is absurd
because it is i n t r i n s i c a l l y  impossible. To take once more the example
of cooking: it might be assumed that the existence of an ignorant man, 
e di bl e materials, and a cookery book, taken together, p ro vi de  the 
necessities of a s el f -m ov ed , concrete act iv it y c a l l e d  'cooking'. But 
this is not true; the cookery book is not an i nd ep en de n tl y  generated 
beginning from which the act iv it y of cooking can spring. Rather, it 
is, in abstract form, an abridgement of somebody's knowledge, acquired 
by experience, of how to cook. It could, of course, h elp  someone 
prepare a dinner; but if it were a ll the person had to go on he would 
ne ve r begin, for "the book speaks only to those who know alr ea dy  the
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kind of thing to expect from it and c on se qu e nt l y how to interpret it."
Now Oakeshott does not deny that p o l i ti c al  i de ologies 
have some use. Indeed, as an a bb re vi a ti on  of a p o l i t i c a l  tradition 
an i de ology can increase our awareness and un derstanding of society. 
However, if an ideol ogy is offered as the sole criterion for p ol i t i c a l  
conduct, the result is disastrous as an ideology is m ere ly  an arrest in 
p o li t i c a l  kno wled ge as a whole. Oakeshott, predictably, dubs marxism, 
socialism, liberalism, and c o l l e c t i v i s m ,  as ideological. Furthermore, 
c o ns e r v a t i s m  can also f all into such a category if it attempts to 
present itse lf  as a number of c l e a r l y  defined, consistant and u n i ve r sa l 
principles. Another doctrine which is "ideolo gi ca l"  is that of 
natural law and natural right. Take the notion of "freedom" as a human 
r i g h t :
F r e e d o m ,  l i k e  a r e c i p e  for g a me  pie, is not a b r i g h t  idea; it 
is not a " h u m a n  r i g h t "  to be d e d u c e d  f r om  s om e s p e c u l a t i v e  
concept of human nature. The freedom which we enjoy is nothing 
m o r e  t han a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  p r o c e d u r e s  of a c e r t a i n  kind: the
f r e e d o m  of an E n g l i s h m a n  is not s o m e t h i n g  e x e m p l i f i e d  in the
p r o c e d u r e  of h a b e a s  c o r p u s ,  it is, at t h a t  p o i n t ,  th e  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  of that procedure. And the freedom which we wish 
to enjoy is not an 'ideal' which we premeditate i n de pen de nt ly  of 
our p o l i t i c a l  e x p e r i e n c e ,  it is w ha t is a l r e a d y  i n i t i m a t e d  in 
that experience. 34
Oakeshott, unlike Burke, cannot support the notion of natural 
law as a given and independent re gu la to r of human conduct existing 
s e p a r at e ly  from human reason (as it is a part of the divine, not human, 
order) and yet p e r c e i v a b l e  by it. This rejection is based firmly on 
Oakeshott's p h i l o s o p h i c a l  position, whereby he denies that anything 
independent of experience can in fact be perceived. Indeed, this very 
point is the core of the imminent nature of Oakeshott's conservatism. 
N ev er th e le ss ,  Oakeshott, despite refuting the natural law doctrine, 
does not deny its traditional u ti li t y altogether: for, as a summary of
Christian values, upon which western society has been based, it is very 
articulate. Oakeshott, then, dymystifies a very important concept and 
puts it to good se cu la r use. Like Burke, Oakeshott p lac es  great 
importance on the role of tradition in society-- but, as we w i ll  see 
below, tradition for Oakeshott is p ur e ly  imminent, and in no way can it 
be seen as a tr an sc en de nt al  r e fe l ec ti o n of the Divine order.
IV
Tr ad itional conduct, for Oakeshott, is act iv it y which is based 
not on r e f l e c t i v e  thought, but on a habit of affection and behaviour.
In no way does this mean that t raditional a c ti vi ty  is irrational, for 
we have a lr ea dy  o b se rv e d that premedit at io n is not necessary for 
rational conduct. According to Oakeshott, "We acquire habits of 
conduct, not by co ns tr uc ti ng  a way of li vi n g upon rules or precepts,
but by l iv i ng  with peo pl e who h a b i t u a l l y  behave in a certain manner: we
acquire habits of conduct in the same way as we acquire our native
language....This sort of education is not compulsory; it is 
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inevitable." It is at once apparent that this sort of conduct offers 
great stabi li ty  both for the i nd iv i du al  and for society. It is not 
prone to sudden changes, but this is most definat el y not to say that it 
w il l  never undergo some alteration. Certain aspects of a tradition 
may become obs ol et e and c ollapse, but, as a tradition cannot be viewed 
as a neat 'system1, this c o l l a p s e  does not e ng ul f  the whole. Indeed, 
not only is tradition unsyst ema ti c- - in a technical sense-- it does not 
contain e x t en si v e and rigid rules, as wou ld  an ideology. Ergo, 
tradition is not prone to destruction r e su lti ng  from the detection of a 
flaw or incoherence in its system of rules. Furthermore, tradition is 
n ev e r a b s o l u t e l y  fixed, and this is why its character is elastic and 
able to adapt to change. For Oakeshott:
Custom is alway s a d ap ta bl e and suscep ti bl e to the nuance of 
the situation. This may appear a paradoxical assertion; custom, 
we h a v e  b e e n  t a u g ht ,  is b l i n d .  It is, h o w e v e r ,  an i n c i d i o u s  
p i e c e  of m i s o b s e r  v a t i o n ;  c u s t o m  is not b l i n d ,  it is o n l y  'as 
b l i n d  as a bat'. And a n y o n e  who has s t u d i e d  a t r a d i t i o n  of 
customary b eh av io r (or a tradition of any other sort) knows that 
both rigidity and inst abi li ty  are foreign to its character. 36
A pract ic al  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of what Oakeshott means here can be
seen in language: "nothing is more habitual or customary than our ways
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of speech, and nothing is more c o nt i nu ou s ly  invaded by change." This 
does not lead us to conclude, however, that tradition is the only means 
of re gul at i ng  our p o l i t i c a l  conduct. To hold such a b eli ef  would be to
commit, albe it  inve rs el y,  the r at io na li st  fallacy; tradition would
e v e n t u a l l y  d e g e n e r a t e  into s t e r i l e  s u p e r s t i t i o n .  W ha t O a k e s h o t t
a d v o c a t e s ,  true to his H e g e l i a n  roots, is a c o m b i n a t i o n  of b ot h 
traditional and technical knowl edg e to govern our p ol i t i c a l  conduct. 
Indeed, taken separately, traditional and technical kn ow le dg e are mere 
abstractions. N ev er th el e ss ,  Oakeshott does warn against the domination 
of technical knowledge in this synthesis, as:
W he n a c t i o n  is c a l l e d  for, s p e c u l a t i o n  or c r i t i c i s m  w i l l  
supervine. B eh av i ou r itself w il l tend to become probl em at ic al , 
s e e k i n g  its s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e  in the c o h e r e n c e  of an i d e o l o g y .  
The p u r s u i t  of p e r f e c t i o n  w i l l  get in the way of a s t a b l e  and 
f le x i b l e  moral tradition, the naive coherence of which w ill  be 
p r i z e d  l e s s  t h an  the u n i t y  w h i c h  s p r i n g s  f rom  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s  
a n aly sis and synthesis. It w ill  seem more important to have an 
i n t e l l e c t u a l l y  d e fe ns ib le  moral ideology than a ready habit of 
moral behaviour. 38
So in the optimum condition society w ill  place the emphasis on
tradition. In this respect, Oakeshott's presumption in favour of
tradition links him c l o s e l y  to Burke. Change is c e rt ai nl y not ruled
out (as Burke remarked, a society without the means of change can not
p re se r ve  itself), but the onus of proof for any proposed change rests
s qu ar el y with the reformer. After all, change of any sort always
causes an immediate loss, whilst only promising a future benefit.
Oakeshott becomes a traditionalist, like Burke, in the sense that he
v a l u es  tradition and the wisdom it contains. The nature of p ol i ti c al
a c ti vi ty which he a dv o ca t es  reflects this:
There are some people, of course, who allow themselves to speak 
As if ar ra ngements were intended 
For nothing else but to be mended
b u t ,  f o r  m o s t  of us, o u r  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  to i m p r o v e  our c o n d u c t  d oes  not p r e v e n t  us f ro m 
recognizing that the greater part of what we h ave is not a burden to be
c a r r i e d  or an i n c u b u s  to be t h r o w n  off, but an i n h e r i t a n c e  to be 
e n j o y e d .  A n d  a c e r t a i n  s h a b b i n e s s  is j o i n e d  w i t h  e v e r y  r e a l  
c o n v e n i e n c e . 39
The ex ample offered by Oakeshott of the legal status of women in
the early part of this century is a good i l l us tr a ti o n of this general
theory. According to Oakeshott, the legal status of women was in
confusion for: "the rights and duties which composed it intimated
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rights and duties which were n e v e r t h e l e s s  not recognized." Thus, the 
reason for the e v e n t u a l  "technical enfranchisement" of women was that 
in all  other important respects they had already been enfranchised. Any 
reference to "natural right" is p at en tl y irrelevant. Within tradition, 
the e nfranchisement of women made the existing order more 
"coherent". This theory, e vi de nt ly ,  is organic: society changes
gr ad ua lly , making i ts el f more coherent and more of a w ho le  via greater 
unity. Nowhere is tradition betrayed or abrogated; rather it is 
i mp roved and b uilt upon. And the movin g force in this process of 
social d e v e l o p m e n t  is not the hand of Providence, as in the 
tr an sce nden tal c o n s e r va ti s m of Burke, but the spontaneous interaction 
of many powers, both conscious and unconscious.
Oakeshott's conception of tradition shows us more c l e a r l y  than 
anywhere else that he is an imminent and secular co nservative. He does 
not concern h i ms e lf  with p e rc e i v i n g  an independent and given moral order 
(such as natural law); such a task in Oakeshott's view is i nherently 
i mp os si bl e as we can only p er ce i ve  what is in our experience.
Oakeshott is not a d i v i n e l y  inspired cons er va ti ve ; yet tradition 
g en u in e ly  p lays a s upra-human role in his thought. However, Oakeshott
wo ul d argue that the prescriptions of tradition are e m p i r i c a l l y  
evident, and so within experience, as opposed to being mere 
abstractions. Take, for example, the e v o l u t i o n  of the British 
p a r l ia m en ta r y system which enshrines our notion of freedom. It
exists in its present form after a long period of trial and error; in 
no sense is it the construction of what was considered by abstract 
reason, at a p ar ti c ul a r time, to be the form of govern me nt  we d es erve 
by some natural right.
V
We can now draw this discussion to a close by examining some of
the practical i mp li ca t io ns  of Oakeshott's p o l it i ca l philosophy. Of
special significance, in my opinion, is the relati on sh ip  Oakeshott sees
between the nature of liberty and the economic structure of society.
Oakeshott s tro ng ly  opposes any abstract definition of the term
'liberty1. Speaking of the libertarian, Oakeshott remarks that: "He
is a libertarian, not because he begins with an abstract definition of
liberty, but because he has a c t u a l l y  enjoyed a way of li v in g (and seen
others enjoy it) which those who enjoyed it are accustomed (on account
of certain precise characteristics) to c a l l  a free way of living, and
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because he has found it to be good." Cl early, we cannot look beyond
our own experience for a definition of liberty: liberty, if it exists,
exists imminently. Thus: "The purpose of the inquiry is not to define
a word, but to detect the secret of what we enjoy, to recognize what is
h o st il e to it, and to discern where and how it may be enjoyed more
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fully." Liberty is not a constant or perfect entity (as ra ti on al is ts
maintain); it is not something which once es ta b li sh e d mere ly  has to be
defended. Therefore, we can quite pr operly speak of e m b e l l i s h i n g  our
present liberty with added coherence and unity. And it is this point
which a l l o w s  for a c re at iv e human input; a lt ho ug h it is crucial to
remember that man has to work with what is given in experience.
Liberty, like Oakeshott's conception of experience, cannot be
seen as consisting of a number of independent components. As Oakeshott
states: "Liberties, it is true, may be distinguished, and some may be
more general or more s e tt le d and mature than others, but the freedom
which the E ng li sh  libertarian knows and v a l u es  lies in a coherence of
m u t u a l l y  supporting liberties, each of which a mp li fi es  the whole and
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none of which stands alone." However, a ll  of these m u t u a l l y
supporting liberties represent one thing, "namely, the absence from our
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society of o v e r w h e l m i n g  concentrations of power." Within any society
there exists raw power; and power endangers liberty w henever it becomes
o v e r l y  concentrated. In the British p ol i t i c a l  tradition power has
been diffused in a number of ways: through the rule of law which checks
arbitrary power; between the institutions of state, such as the church,
parliament, the executive, and the judiciary; and through the right of
v o lu n t a r y  association which has a l l o w e d  groups with common social or
economic interest to form. The diffusion of power is, then, of
paramount importance to the maintenance of liberty. Remarking about
the libertarian, Oakeshott states that: "He w i ll  know that no
i ndi vi du al , no group, association or union can be entrusted with much
power, and that it is mere f ool is hn es s to c o m pl ai n  when power is
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abused. It exists to be abused."
A ba lance of power must exist for a society to be g en u in el y
free. Yet, just as liberty is never a fixed constant, the balance of
power is never p e r m a ne n tl y secure. The libertarian cannot a l l o w  his
guard to drop, for: "Arrangements which in their beginnings promoted a
dispersion of power often, in the course of time, t h e m s e l v e s  become
o v e r - mi g ht y or even a bs o lu te  while sti ll  cla im in g the recognition and
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l oy a lt y which b e lo n ge d to them in respect of their first character."
The institution of state which is most li k el y  to lust after power is 
the government. For Oakeshott, a libertarian g ov er n me n t is one which 
operates within the rule of law-- and thus a ck no wl ed ge s the limitations 
of its authority-- whil st  st il l being prepared to use its legitimate 
power c ou ra g eo us l y when required (such as when measures are necessary 
to ensure the continued rightful b al an ce  of power). Oakeshott places,
then, a great emphasis on the rule of law in a free society:
B u t  g o v e r n m e n t  by r u l e  of l a w  ( t h a t  is, by m e a n s  of 
enforcement by prescri be d methods of set tl ed  r ul es  binding alike 
on go ve rn or s and governed), while losing nothing in strength, is 
i ts e lf  the e m b l e m  of that diffusion of power which it exists to 
p r o m o t e ,  and is t h e r e f o r e  p e c u l i a r l y  a p p r o p r i a t e  to a free 
society. It is the method of govern me nt  most economical in the 
use of power; it i n v o l v e s  a partnership between past and present 
and b e t w e e n  g o v e r n o r s  and g o v e r n e d  w h i c h  l e a v e s  no r oo m  for 
a r b i t r a r i n e s s ;  it e n c o u r a g e s  a t r a d i t i o n  of r e s i s t e n c e  to the 
g r o w t h  of d a n g e r o u s  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  of p o w e r  w h i c h  is far m ore  
ef fe ct iv e than any p r om isc uo us  o n s l a u g h t  h o w e v e r  c r u s h i n g ;  it 
c on tr o ls  e f fe c ti v el y , but without breaking the grand affirmitive 
flow of things; and it gives a practical definition of the kind
of limited but necessary service a society may expect from its
government, restraining us from vain and dangerous expectations. 
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In Oakeshott's opinion property is the most important source of power,
and he a s s e r t s  that: "In e v e r y  s o c i e t y  an i n s t i t u t i o n  of p r o p e r t y  is 
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u n a v o i d a b l e . "  The o n l y  r e l e v a n t  q u e s t i o n ,  then, is w hat  f orm this
property ownership w il l take? The two logical extremes are
that either all property w ill  be owned by the state, or that property
w il l  be p r i v a t e l y  held by many individuals. Now, for Oakeshott,
there is no doubt which form is most agreea bl e to liberty: "it w ill  be
one which a l l o w s  the widest distribution, and which discourages most
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e f f e c t i v e l y  great and dangerous concentrations of this power." And 
the f o l l o w i n g  condition is the one most l ik el y to ensure such a proper 
distribution:
The i n s t i t u t i o n  of p r o p e r t y  m o s t  f a v o u r a b l e  to l i b e r t y  is, 
un questionably, a right to p ri va te  property least q u a li f ie d by 
arbitrary limits and exclusions, for it is by this means only
t hat  the m a x i m u m  d i f f u s i o n  of the p o w e r  t hat  s p r i n g s  f rom
ownership may be achieved. 50
In a very real sense, therefore, an E n g l i s h m a n ’s home is his 
castle, protecting him from the external forces of economic coercion. 
The free market, for Oakeshott, is an essential element of property 
right; and this contention i n v o l v e s  Oakeshott in a vigorous defence of 
capitalism. Eve ry  i n di vi d ua l  has a right to the pursuit of property; 
a l tho ug h actual success w i ll  depend on a number of factors, most 
i m po r ta nt l y the a b il it y of the individual. Thus, like Locke and Burke, 
Oakeshott maintains that a m a n ’s ta lents are his own property and are 
to be e xp l oi te d  at w i ll  for personal gain. Inevitably, as a result, 
property w il l  be u n e q u a l l y  distributed; however, for the libertarian, 
the important point is that it w il l be distributed. If this were not 
the case, and property were to a cc um u la t e in a few hands, then 
dangerous co nc en trations of power w ould build up. Such a situation 
wo ul d lead to s lavery, for:
The freedom which separates a man from s l a v e r y  is nothing but 
a f r e e d o m  to c h o o s e  and to m o v e  a m o n g  a u t o n o m o u s ,  i n d e p e n d e n t  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s ,  firms, p u r c h a s e r s  of l a b o u r ,  and this i m p l i e s  
p r i v a t e  p r o p e r t y  in r e s o u r c e s  o t h e r  than p e r s o n a l  c a p a c i t y .
W h e r e v e r  a m e a n s  of p r o d u c t i o n  f a l l s  u n d e r  the c o n t r o l  of a
single power, s l a v e r y  in some measure follows. 51
Capitalism, for Oakeshott, is essential for liberty. 
Egalitarians, of course, argue that if property is the source of most 
power only an equal distribution of property to all can secure liberty. 
Oakeshott would contend, however, that such a policy would be ruinous
for it would require the strong hand of state control: in practice, if
not in theory, the state would soon own al l  property and become al l  
power f u l .
In Britain the greatest threat to liberty is posed by economic
monopolies. The libertarian w i l l  find monop o l i e s  repulsive, be they
state owned or not, for: "All monopolies, or near monopolies, he knows
as impediments to that liberty, and the greatest single institution
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which stands between us and mono p o l y  is private property." This may, 
to some, make Oakeshott's position appear contradictory: a free market
is to be encouraged, and yet, experience shows us, free markets 
frequently encourage monopolies. Oakeshott responds by arguing that 
ef f e ctive competition ought to be maintained in a free market 
environment. This w ill require some i n tervention by the government, 
but as such action protects our liberty it is p e r f ectly legitimate and 
desirable. The checking of monopolies, Oakeshott concedes, i n v o l v e s  
us in some sacrifice because m o n o p o l i e s  frequently generate greater 
economic efficiency. N e v e r theless, if this sacrifice is seen as the 
price necessary to procure our liberty, it becomes joyously bearable.
Like Burke, then, Oakeshott sees a proper role for government in 
e s t a b l i s h i n g  an o p t i m u m  e c o n o m i c  s t r u c t u r e  for a free s o c i e t y .  
O a k e s h o t t  is not a l a i s s e z - f a i r e  l i b e r a l ,  as the f o l l o w i n g  p a s s a g e  
i l l u s t r a t e s :
In other words, he (the libertarian) w i l l  recognize that the 
o n l y  way of o r g a n i z i n g  the e n t e r p r i s e  of g e t t i n g  a l i v i n g  so 
t hat it d o e s  not c u r t a i l  the f r e e d o m  he l o v e s  is by the 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of e f f e c t i v e  c o m p e t i t i o n .  He w i l l  k n o w  that 
e f f e c t i v e  c o m p e t i t i o n  is not s o m e t h i n g  that s p r i n g s  up of its 
own accord, that both it and any a l t e r n a t i v e  to it are creatures 
of l a w ;  b u t  s i n c e  he h a s  o b s e r v e d  t h e  c r e a t i o n  ( o f t e n  
i n a d v e r t e n t l y )  by la w  of m o n o p o l i e s  and o t h e r  i m p e d i m e n t s  to 
freedom, he w i l l  not think it beyond the capacity of his society 
to build upon its already substantial tradition of creating and 
maintaining e f f e c t i v e  competition by law. 53
For Oakeshott, a laissez-faire policy is most u n l i k e l y  to 
maximise liberty; indeed, through its implicit tolerance of monopolies 
it threatens our freedom. So Oakeshott insists that the government 
must o c c a sionaly use its power to improve the economic structure of 
society; but any action, of course, is not to be arbitrary but within 
the rule of law.
If Burke can be seen as the most eminent c o n s e r v a t i v e  of the 
c l a s s i c a l  school, Oakeshott has a c o n v i n c i n g  cla i m  to be considered the 
most eminent modern. Oakeshott's immediate, idealist philosophy 
pla c e s  experience c o m p l e t e l y  within man's present consciousness.
There is no room for the mystical hand of Provi d e n c e  to scribble
copious notes through history (so offering man i n f a l l a b l e
and independent guidance). Yet significant similar i t i e s  do exist
between Burke and Oakeshott. Most noteably their theories converge 
in an attack on abstract rationalism, a theory they cannot dismiss as 
me r e l y  ridiculous because of the grave practical dangers it presents.
In reminding their contemporaries of the importance of traditional 
experience, Burke and Oakeshott become increasingly reliant 
on this principle and e f f e c t i v e l y  adopt a deeply pessimistic view 
a b o u t  the e x t e n t  of h u m a n  r e a son. If this is the n e g a t i v e  s ide of 
what is common in the thought of Burke and Oakeshott, the p ositive side 
is certainly the convi n c i n g  refutation of abstract, perfect knowledge 
both thinkers made in the idiom of their times.
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So many try to say Not Now,
So many have forgotton how 
To say I am, and would be 
Lost, if they could, in history
W . H . Auden 
Another Time
CHAPTER IV 
OAKESHOTT CRITICALLY EXAMINED
We can now turn to a critical examination of Oakeshott's
thought. In an interesting and p r o v o c a t i v e  r eview of Oakeshott's book
'Rationalism in Politics', Julian Fran k l i n  a r t i culates what I consider
the most damaging criticism of Oakeshott's p h i l o s o p h i c a l  position.
Franklin states that: "... what Oakeshott is attempting is l o g i c a l l y
impossible,  the structure of a concrete whole simply cannot be
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described or anal y z e d  within the limits of ordinary logic." In a
concrete whole each part is affected by the other parts in a complex
structure of inter-relationships; now, if in order to describe one part
we must have a l r e a d y  described the others, as they affect it, there is
simply no place to begin. Furthermore, Franklin comments: "It may be
noted that if we cannot analyze the structure of a concrete whole we
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can never have reason to b e l i e v e  that one exists." Oakeshott's 
rebuttal, I think, would be twofold: first, he would deny that it is 
possible to perc e i v e  a concrete whole by analyzing its parts (or modes) 
and second, Oakeshott would argue that his very aim is to break the 
current bounds of ph i l o s o p h y  and logical analysis. This puts Oakeshott
in the same category as Hegel: although, unlike Hegel, Oakeshott is 
f u n d a m e n t a l l y  sceptical about the likely success of creating such a 
new philosophy. Indeed, Oakeshott's position is that philosophy, 
p r operly defined, is prob a b l y  a pursuit man is incapable of performing.
It is important to be fair to Oakeshott here: we may not like 
the idea that ph i l o s o p h y  is a pursuit which is beyond us, but in itself 
such a view cannot be criticised merely because it is unpalatable.
What we can say h o w e v e r - -  and leav i n g  aside any question of the 
v a l i d i t y  of Oakeshott's position-- is that Oakeshott is w e l l  on the way 
to becoming a c o n s e r v a t i v e  nihilist. O r i g i n a l l y  it can be argued 
that one of the more attractive e l ements of Oakeshott's brand of 
idealism is that it maintains that truth is contained within 
experience. This suggests that truth is a c cessable to us: but 
Oakeshott asserts that this is the case only in a very partial sense-- 
for the ultimate truth, the u l timate reality, is found in p h ilosophy as 
it comprehends experience in its totality without reservation or 
arrest. Similarly, when we come to p o l i t i c a l  conduct, Oakeshott's 
imminent cons e r v a t i s m  may not be the demystified, secular guide some 
have thought. Oakeshott's deep scepticism is i l l u s t r a t e d  in the 
f o l l o w i n g  passage:
In p o l i t i c a l  activity, then, men sail a b o u n dless and bottomless 
sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, 
neither a s t a r t i n g - p l a c e  nor appointed destination. The enterprise 
is to keep afloat on an even keel; the sea is both friend and enemy; 
and the seamanship consists in using the resources of a traditional 
m a n n e r  of b e h a v i o u r  in o r d e r  to m ake a f r i e n d  of e v e r y  i n i m i c a l  
occasion. 3
Oakeshott e x p l i c i t l y  states that the given in experience is 
given to be transformed. How does this principle effect our pol i t i c a l  
conduct? We must c onclude that our tradition is given to us in order 
to be transformed. This organic c o n s e r v a t i s m  implies two things: 
first, our tradition is not perfect or static, and thus can be 
transformed and improved; and secondly, in order to transform our 
tradition we must adopt a posi t i v e  and critical attitude to what we 
find in experience. There seems to be an important human creative 
input here: our society does not e v o l v e  spontaneously, if it were to do
so it would be independent of us. Manifestly, if man is to play a
role in his destiny his critical, or rational, powers are of 
consummating importance. However, the cardinal question must now be 
faced: what sort of criteria do we adopt in seeking to transform the
given in experience? Burke, I h ave argued, saw natural law as a
guiding principle. Oakeshott dismisses such a concept; he also 
dismisses utopian theories which construct a future ideal towards 
which we should strive. Rather, Oakeshott looks back and asks: 
what do we see in our tradition? After answering this question we can 
begin to understand how we s hould go about improving our tradition.
Ergo, we should aim in the transformation of a given tradition to make 
that tradition more coherent, more unified. Right reason, therefore, 
works h a r m o n i o u s l y  with tradition. It is in this sense that Oakeshott 
is an imminent conservative.
Does this view place c o n s e r v a t i s m  on a firmer foundation? We 
can try to answer this question from the p h i l o s o p h o c a l  angle by 
examining Oakeshott's conception of truth. Oakeshott denies that
truth can be an external criteria (such as natural law) which is
independent of our experience. Truth, then, cannot be seen as
correspondence to an external law; a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  Oakeshott argues that
truth is coherence to tradition and the experience it contains. Thus,
Oakeshott states that: "In experience, we begin, consequently, with the
negation of the presented unity wherever that is seen to be false or 
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inadequate." Yet, how do we e v a l u a t e  whether something is false or 
inadequate and therefore incoherent? Taking Oakeshott's example of the 
enfranchisement of women, why was this action seen as making the 
British tradition more coherent? The contrary could be asserted if we 
argue that the British tradition enshrines the notion of female 
inferiority, and that any rights which have been surrendered to women 
represent a dangerous aberration from tradition and therefore ought to 
be abrogated. If such opposites can be promoted as being coherent, 
does not truth as coherence become m e aningless? It seems to me that 
Oakeshott is attempting to est a b l i s h  an immediate and uniform 
conception of coherence; like Burke, Oakeshott suggests that 'right 
reason' w i l l  interpret tradition correctly. Nevertheless, if 
coherence relates to experience, and experience- for Oakeshott- 
requires judgement, w i l l  not differing opinions spring from individual 
judgement? What c o m p e l s  judgement to be uniform and not distinct and 
i n d i v i d u a l ?  Ulti m a t e l y ,  Oakeshott's view of what is coherent is based 
on belief, it is not immediate nor s elf-evident; and b elief is also the 
basis of any natural law. In this respect, I find no greater 
satisfaction in Oakeshott's imminent conservatism.
86.
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In the prev i o u s  chapter we observed how important the concept of
reason is to Oakeshott, and how he maintains that the premeditation of
ends is not necessary for rational conduct. As R.E D o w l i n g  remarks,
for Oakeshott: "The sole test of rationality is coherence with
traditional conduct, and any action, be it premeditated, spontaneous,
impulsive, or u n t h i n k i n g l y  habitual, which is coherent with traditional
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conduct, is rational." This definition of rational conduct is 
revolutionary: since the time of Aristotle rational conduct has been 
seen as action for which reasons can be given. Oakeshott, in his 
definition of rational conduct, d e l i b e r a t e l y  under-emphasises the 
utility of man's critical powers. Like Burke, as a result, Oakeshott 
adopts a strong presumption in favour of tradition. The danger here is
that this strong presumption can a l l  too easily slip towards an
unquestioning intuition. And it should be remembered that if we are 
to take Oakeshott's view of truth as coherence seriously, man has to be 
vigi l a n t  in using his critical powers f u l l y  in order to root out 
i n c o h e r e n c e .
Oakeshott criticises r a tionalists for their dismissal of
tradition and practical experience. Yet it is far from clear to me why
rationa l i s t s  have to adopt such an extreme position. It seems that 
Oakeshott could be attacking a straw man here: if rationalists do
indeed dismiss tradition and practical experience, then their theories 
are c e r t ainly predestined to absurdity. However, no rationalist, 
m erely to be a rationalist, need hold Oakeshott's conception of an
independent mind existing prior to experience. Such a mind is utterly
impossible. The mature r a t i onalist position, as I see^it, is that we
must pass judgement on our experience, in no way is such judgement
independent of our experience. Furthermore, pol i t i c a l  conduct,
r a t i o n a l l y  undertaken, requires the premeditation of ends (together
with reasons for their pursuit) and the provision of means to their
achievement. Again, this a c tivity is not by definition independent of
our experience, as Oakeshott suggests the rationalists claim. We can
agree with Dowling as he remarks: "Surely the assertion that
premeditated ends are necessary for rational conduct may be
d istinguished from the assertion that i ndependently premeditated ends
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are necessary for rational conduct."
To i l l u s t r a t e  this argument we can take the example of marxism,
a r a t i onalist ideology par excellence. Marx certainly did not b e l i e v e
that he had cut h i m self off from tradition and historical experience in
order to conc e i v e  the perfect society: he did not postulate his
theories as being, in this sense, independent and abstract. Indeed,
Marx thought that he was the first person to interpret history properly
and thus s o l v e  the p uzzle of social evolution. It s hould be remembered
that Marx would not spe c u l a t e  in detail about the part i c u l a r s  of a
communist society because al l  ideas are tied to their contemporary
social experience. Marx would have agreed with Hegel that "it is just
as s i l l y  to suppose that any p h i l o s o p h y  goes beyond its contemporary
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world, as that an i n d i v i d u a l  can jump beyond his time." Thus Marx was 
reticent about the character of a communist society because he lacked 
the necessary experience and knowledge to say anything worthwhile.
In his attack on rational conduct, Oakeshott is very close to 
the position of Burke. Both distinguish between practical and 
technical knowledge, and they further agree in placing the emphasis in 
this dichotomy upon the practical (also termed traditional) 
component. Thus, Burke and Oakeshott urge us to support tradition 
unless very good reasons can be g i v e n  to do otherwise. Perhaps there 
is nothing too ob j e c t i o n a b l e  here, for such a static theory at least 
plays safe (although one must concede that just as a reforming action 
can lead to harm by disturbing the status quo, so can inaction lead to 
harm in the face of changing circumstances). If tradition and 
experience are so important to Oakeshott's thought, how are we ever 
going to understand our tradition if technical (or reflective) 
kn o w ledge is so weak? We w i l l  return to this point in the next 
section; now it is enough to reiterate that despite what s u p e r f i c i a l l y  
appears to be a p o sitive philosophy, with room for a substantial 
creative human input, Oakeshott's implicit position is that man can do 
lit t l e  to alter his destiny: g e nerally, it is far better for him to sit 
back and enjoy what is given. Again, and like Burke, Oakeshott loses 
a v a l u a b l e  existential dimension to his thought; and this, it is my 
contention, contradicts his basic philosophy.
As Oakeshott sees an ideology as e s s e n t i a l l y  a rationalist's 
crib, ideol o g i c a l  conduct is c l o s e l y  related to rational conduct.
Again we must ask o u r s e l v e s  why i d e o l o g i c a l  conduct must be seen as 
ne c e s s a r i l y  s p e c u l a t i v e  and independent of experience? I find no 
further satisfaction in Oakeshott's view that ideologies are only 
arrested abridgements of past experience (as they i n e v i t a b l y  fail to be
independent and abstract). This argument can only be valid if 
experience can be shown to lead to one uniform conclusion: however, we
have already obse r v e d  that there are grave doubts as to whether 
experience functions in such a manner. Al l  that Oakeshott offers us 
here is the assertion that ideologies are based in experience: this 
states the obvious.
In seeing i d eologies as a series of simplistic, but 
comprehensive, s o l utions to the wide range of p o l i t i c a l  problems man 
faces, Oakeshott appears to hold a view similar to the usual 
misinterpretation of natural law where a cosmic p ositive law is sought. 
However, ideologies rarely present t h e m s e l v e s  in the form of a thousand 
and one uniform rules for e v eryday life. Rather, it appears to me, 
ideologies can be reduced to a number of basic p r inciples (which 
represent a world view, or basic interpretation of experience). The 
means to these p r i n c i p l e s  (or ends) are often very many indeed; and in 
order to choose the most efficacious means many mature rationalists, I 
have no doubt, would emphasise the importance of experience. Now, if 
we refuse to see an ideology simply as a c o l l e c t i o n  of abstract and 
s p e c u l a t i v e  principles, we can begin to argue that con s e r v a t i s m  would 
be in better shape if stopped being a mere disposition and started to 
reflect upon the basic princi p l e s  which make up its own character.
Ill
Given that Oakeshott turns to tradition for a more reli a b l e  
guide to p o l i t i c a l  conduct, it is essential that he p rovides us with a 
satisfactory understanding of tradition. Our primary question is
whether tradition can exist in an independent and objective sense: does
tradition merely await our di s c o v e r y ?  This would have the advantage of
making tradition uniform and absolute, any disagreement between
individuals, or between ideologies, concerning the nature of tradition
w ou l d  be attributable to error or misinterpretation. However,
Oakeshott cannot accept this conception of tradition: if tradition is
independent and objective, then it is beyond our experience. Anything
beyond our experience cannot be known, and manifestly the unknown can
never provide us with a guide to p o l i t i c a l  conduct. So how are we to
prop e r l y  c onceive of tradition? Oakeshott has p r ovided the answer, I
think, in discussing the nature of history: "What r e a l l y  happened (a
fixed and finished course of events, immune from change) as the end in
history must, if history is to be rescued from nonentity, be replaced
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by 'what the evidence o b l i g e s  us to believe'." C l e a r l y  a thorough 
examination of the evid e n c e  requires the full u tilisation of man's 
critical powers; tradition is not, as a result, an a l t e r n a t i v e  to 
reason- they are both parts of the same whole. Nevertheless, we are 
left with a cardinal difficulty: w i l l  the evidence o blige everyone to 
interpret tradition u n i f o r m a l l y ?  Burke argued that we would achieve 
consensus if we a p p l i e d  'right reason'; and Oakeshott seems to agree as 
he argues that if we s trive to attain a genuine 'sympathy* for 
tradition p roblems of misinterp r e t a t i o n  w i l l  be obviated.
This position appears most unsatisfactory to me: we have already 
i l l u s t r a t e d  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of legitimate disagreement about what is 
contained within tradition with the e x a mple of the enfranchisement of 
women. Under these circumstances, to turn to the principle of
coherence offers us no way out: we are always left with the question
"coherence to what"? Obviously, if p eople interpret tradition 
diffe r e n t l y  their idea of what is coherent will utterly lack 
consistency. Simply, coherence only works if tradition is uniform and 
a b s o l u t e .
Oakeshott also ignores the p o s s i b i l i t y  that there may be more
than one tradition within society. As R.H.S.Crossman contends: "Why
s hould we presuppose that, inside the territory we call
Britain....there is only one society, with one tradition? Why should
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there not be two societies...each with its own way of life?"
Supposing that we can identify one macro-tradition within society 
(which may contain, without contradiction, micro-traditions), how does 
this tradition d e v e l o p ?  Oakeshott answers that we make our tradition 
more coherent, and his implicit contention is that this d e v e l o p m e n t  is 
very gradual indeed. This is i l l u s t r a t e d  in the example of the 
enfranchisment of women: this was not, argues Oakeshott, a critical and
dramatic action; rather, it f o r m a l l y  recognised an existing situation 
(the growing equa l i t y  of women). However, whilst admitting that the 
p a r t i c u l a r  social undercurrents were strong and w ell established, can 
we not argue that events such as the Magna Carta, the B i l l  of Rights, 
or the P a r l i a m e n t a r y  Reform Acts, have a far more climacteric 
significance? Certainly, the forces of reaction which r e s p e c t i v e l y  
opposed these measures would seem to question the view that they were 
mere historical formalities. If their critical significance is 
granted, then we can see social d e v e l o p m e n t  proceeding via a number of 
quite dramatic, not gradual, steps. Furthermore, if this is the case,
then coherence could become a far more radical concept (as it is in 
science when new discoveries, formulated within the flow of scientific 
experience, d r a m a t i c a l l y  alter our interpretation of the natural 
w o r l d ) .
IV
The role of the state, for Oakeshott, is s t rictly limited.
Unlike Burke, Oakeshott does not see the state existing to promote 
virtue, or someother lofty notion. Thus, Oakeshott's thought does not 
slip towards an unstated t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m  in the pursuit of a higher, 
mystical value. Rather, the raison d1 etre of the state is to prevent 
the a c c u m u l a t i o n  in society of great concentrations of power. In this 
respect, I think, Oakeshott is on a far better footing when he 
criticises s o c i a l i s m  for leading to a strong, a l l - p o w e r f u l  state, than 
when he tries to maintain that as an ideology soc i a l i s m  is h o p e l e s s l y  
abstract.
Oakeshott's central point, and I think that it contributes much
to c o n s e r v a t i v e  thought, is that freedom or liberty can only exist if
large concentrations of power are absent from society. However, what
precise meaning do we attach to freedom? True to his imminent roots,
Oakeshott sees freedom as something which h a p pily exists in Britain,
although it is not n e c e s s a r i l y  perfect. Thus he remarks: "the
purpose of the inquiry is not to define a word, but to detect the
secret of what we enjoy, to recognise what is hostile to it, and to
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discern where and how it may be enjoyed more fully." In emphasising 
that freedom is c l o s e l y  linked to our p o l i t i c a l  experience, Oakeshott
performs a valuable, but perhaps not original, service; n evertheless, 
there is a tendency for this view to slip towards a rather passive 
intuition which encourages us merely to enjoy our inheritance and good 
fortune. M a n i f e s t l y  this attitude is dangerous: if we are to truly 
protect and val u e  our inheritance we must surely employ our critical 
faculties to the full; and if we a c t u a l l y  ask o u r s e l v e s  in 
what sense we think we are free and how this freedom is secured in 
tradition, do we not end up with a working definition of freedom? The 
a l t e r n a t i v e  view, it appears to me, is to see freedom as chance: and 
this denies a primary human role in the d e v e l o p m e n t  of freedom. Again, 
such a view is dangerous: if man's role is so peripheral how can he 
ever defend freedom? Of course, chance plays a part in the conduct of 
life, but we cannot, I hope, see chance as the main mo t i v a t i n g  force-- 
this is p r ovided by the needs of man. Thus man, in examining
tradition, is always examining the tradition of man: tradition is not a
mystical concept d i v o r c e d  from the experience of man. This is the
essence of Oakeshott's p h i l o s o p h y   yet he applies this theory with
cri p p l i n g  arrest when he examines the nature of freedom.
Oakeshott argues that the freedom we enjoy is made up from 
many specific liberties which i n t er-relate and compl i m e n t  each other.
To a substantial degree this is true, one would not expect to find the
right to free speech, for instance, existing without other democratic 
rights such as the freedom of association or u n i v e r s a l  suffrage.
Indeed, it is meaningful to look at freedom as a coherent whole: its 
components are not separate parts but critical elem e n t s  all essential 
to liberty; if any one right is abrogated then the whole is
endangered, perhaps even moribund. However, is the underlying 
principle one of such absolute coherence? Surely, we can also argue 
that there is a r e l a t i v e  tension within western democratic countries; 
different liberties can generate different demands and u l t i m a t e l y  cause 
contradiction. The most extreme example would be the paradox of 
democracy: if we accept the p r i nciple of democracy are we also
committed to any government which is elected in a democracy? What, for 
example, is a democrat to do if a marxist government is elected and 
committed to o b v iating traditional liberties? Oakeshott does not 
address h i m s e l f  to such difficulties.
As property is the main source of power, pol i t i c a l  and economic
freedoms are synonymous to Oakeshott. F.A. Hayek is close to
Oakeshott's position when he remarks that: "The gradual transformation
of a rigidly organised hierachic system into one where men could at
least attempt to shape their own life, where man gained the opportunity
of knowing and choosing between forms of life, is c l o s e l y  associated
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with the growth of commerce." This is an important point as it rules 
out c h a n c e  as the f o u n d a t i o n  of l i b e r t y  and r e p l a c e s  it w i t h  a 
pa r t i c u l a r  human need. It is on this association between economic and 
po l i t i c a l  freedom that Oakeshott rests his defence of the c a pitalist 
system: many, no doubt, criticise Oakeshott's theories as unefficacious
by p r e v e n t i n g  the widest possible distribution of property which can 
only be acquired by s o c i alistic means. Oakeshott's rebuttal is 
that any system which a b o lishes the market requires an i n t o l e r a b l e  
l e v e l  of state control, and this leads i n e v i t a b l y  to servitude. 
Ne v e r theless, Oakeshott does not a d vocate unrestrained capitalism;
indeed he warns us about the danger of commercial monopolies, as w ell 
as gov e r n m e n t a l  monopolies, becoming too powerful. Yet on the practical 
side Oakeshott gives us l i ttle indication of what can be considered 
"too powerful". When exactly does a persons free right to pursue 
property turn into an i n t o l e r a b l e  degree of power? This is a 
difficulty, but my main objection to Oakeshott's economic theory is 
that appears to be so negative. His central p r i n ciple is that the 
government must guard against great accumu l a t i o n s  of power springing- 
up. This, like much of Oakeshott's thought, deals scantly with the 
plight of the individual. Why not turn the question on its head and 
ask whether the go v e r n m e n t  can help those i n d i v i d u a l s  who exercise 
hardly no power as they w a l l o w  in the mire of social deprivation? This 
emphasis would make our practical approach to economic matters much 
more positive; it would also expunge the lingering sense of a m b i v a l e n c e  
many c o n s e r v a t i v e s  have to what is loosely c a l l e d  the welfare state.
V
Like Burke before him, Oakeshott sees tradition as the core of 
conservatism. However, Oakeshott does not find in tradition a set of 
tested rules: tradition is not the manifestation in the secular world
of natural law. Therefore, proper c o n s e r v a t i v e  action is not concerned 
with correspondence to an u l t i m a t e l y  external code of conduct; rather, 
p o l i t i c a l  action ought to be concerned with coherence to an 
established, imminent tradition. This is, in essence, Oakeshott's 
fundamental thesis. Yet, we have obse r v e d  very real practical 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  with this view. Esse n t i a l l y ,  these difficu l t i e s  can be 
summarised in the question "what can be considered coherent?" It is
because Oakeshott can never c o n f idently face this question within the 
context of his imminent philosophy, that he slips into a passive 
reliance on inclination. In the end, Oakeshott accords to tradition 
negative function: the u ltimate expression of this comes both in his
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  scepticism and in his assertion that con s e r v a t i s m  ought 
to be considered a disposition.
Oakeshott's imminent c o n s e r v a t i s m  fails because it attempts the 
impossible: no theory, least of a l l  a c o n s e r v a t i v e  one, can get away 
from the primary function of judgement and interpretation. The 
question is not what tradition is-- which surely must be beyond our 
experience-- but what p eople think tradition is. Everywhere the first 
step is one of be l i e f  and not one of inevit a b l e  action dictated by 
"what the evidence obli g e s  us to believe". For imminent conserv a t i s m  
to be credible, tradition would have to be absolute-- we could then 
j u s t  s l a v i s h l y  f o l l o w  t r a d i t i o n .  But for t r a d i t i o n  to be a b s o l u t e  
immediate and independent, Oakeshott himself concedes, is impossible.
The almost i n e v i t a b l e  vacuousness of Oakeshott's thought is 
seen in his argument that c o n s e r v a t i s m  does not "travel well". For 
example, if we reduce the British p o l i t i c a l  experience to a number of 
principles, it remains the British experience. To export these 
p r i n c i p l e s  to South Africa, for instance, is nonsense because South 
Africa does not possess the same p o l i t i c a l  experience to support such 
values. Frankly, I find this view t o t a l l y  one dimensional as it 
assumes man's ability to learn from experience is very limited indeed. 
Let us take the e x a m p l e  of freedom as it is loosely understood in the 
west. Oakeshott's argument insists that tradition can only teach
in a posi t i v e  fashion  that is, if freedom exists in our tradition we
can see it to be good. However, why cannot tradition teach in a
negative fashion-- why can't the people of South Africa see that 
freedom is good because their tradition has shown them how a p p a l l i n g  
the alterna t i v e ,  racial tyranny, is? We can surely argue that there 
are a number of ways within tradition to reach a particular conclusion.
If this is the case, c o n s e r v a t i s m  may t ravel very w e l l  indeed.
Finally, we must ask o u r s e l v e s  whether it is satisfactory to 
restrict p o l i t i c a l  experience to strict national boundaries, as 
Oakeshott does? No modern country exists c o m p l e t e l y  independent of 
other nations or from other cultures. Given this, we must concede 
that p o l i t i c a l  experience is not formed by purely parochial 
influences. Thus it is not specious to talk of a world wide bank of 
experience being built up by international influences, organisations 
(such as the United Nations) and by inter-continental communications. 
None of this denies the primacy of national identity, but if experience 
is to be seen as a whole it must be perceived in all its dimensions.
Ess e n t i a l l y ,  Oakeshott's thought is weakest in its failure to 
act upon the distinction between personal experience and mere personal 
experience. C l early, experience forms each mind indivi d u a l l y ,  but thi3 
does not make it a m erely personal phenomenon. Each mind is a world 
but each world is in the same universe. This is true both of 
i n d i v i d u a l s  and of nations. Sadly, there is no room in Oakeshott's 
thought for the final, cosmic and unifying dimension because, quite 
simply, he sees ph i l o s o p h y  as a pursuit we are incapable of performing.
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The world is blind and you belong to it.
You men on earth attribute every cause 
To the celestial movements, as if they 
Alone moved all things by necessity.
Dante Alighieri 
The Divine Comedy
CHAPTER V 
A MORE COHERENT CONSERVATISM.
Both Oakeshott and Burke devote much time to the question of 
rationalism. In Burke's case, rational conduct is that which utilises 
right reason in an attempt to correspond to tradition and natural law. 
According to Oakeshott, any action which is coherent with tradition is 
considered rational; moreover, the contention that one must give 
premeditated reasons for rational conduct is e x p l i c i t l y  denied. Now, 
as remarked in earl i e r  chapters, there are d i fficulties with both of 
these interpretations of reason. E s s e n t i a l l y  a l l  objections can be 
reduced to the view that tradition can only function r e l i a b l y  for 
either Burke or Oakeshott if it is considered absolute. If tradition 
is not absolute, then agreement about what is li k e l y  to correspond to, 
or be coherent with, tradition w ill not be possible.
This penetrating weakness f o l l o w s  from the fact that Burke and 
Oakeshott are driven d e f e n s i v e l y  towards the concept of tradition after 
their o v e r - z e a l o u s  attack on the abstract r ationalism of their 
opponents. Tradition qu i c k l y  assumes a primary role in their theories
without either being properly understood or developed. This is a 
consequence of defining rationalism in a very extreme way indeed: in
fact, we are presented merely with a convincing refutation of extreme 
r a t i onalism (that is, r a t i onalism which claims to be based upon - and 
capa b l e  of - absolute and independent knowledge). Burke and Oakeshott 
both commit a cardinal error when they proceed to e x t r apolate from this 
partial critique and attempt to discredit the concept of r a t i onalism in 
general. The result of this is that the theories of Burke and 
Oakeshott are h e a v i l y  stamped with the rather feeble notion of 
disposition.
We can dwe l l  on this point of c o n s e r v a t i s m  as a disposition for a 
moment. Extreme rationalism is condemned - correctly - because it is 
div o r c e d  from experience, p a r t i c u l a r l y  the experience of tradition. 
However, Burke and Oakeshott can be criticised t h e m s e l v e s  for a 
specious commitment to traditional experience. A disposition is a mere 
superficial reaction to what is giv e n  in our world: it is pri m i t i v e  and
undeveloped. This cer t a i n l y  does not mean that a disposition is never 
right; what we feel disposed to is frequently very good for us. 
N e v e rtheless, to discern the efficacy of a disposed feeling we must 
utilise our powers of v o l i t i o n  and criticism. Only then can we have a 
firm and confident commitment to concepts first s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y  
p e r c eived through a general, emotional disposition. The a l t e r n a t i v e  
is to argue that disposition can be used as a primary justification for 
various forms of p o l i t i c a l  conduct. Such an argument surely builds the 
house of c o n s e r v a t i s m  on a foundation of i n t e l l e c t u a l  sand. It 
c e r t a i n l y  must be stated that a disposition can never represent a
1 01 .
neutral state of rest for we are always faced with a critical choice 
between a l tering or maintaining a certain mode of behaviour.
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We have reached a crucial point in this inquiry: rationalism, to 
be rationalism, need not be divorced from experience and tradition. 
Indeed, if we define moderate rati o n a l i s m  as a desire to question what 
is given in experience in an attempt to better understand it (leading to 
subsequent affirmation or rejection) it must be given a home in 
conservatism. If this is granted, we have reached a position where 
c o n s e r v a t i s m  is no longer viewed p r i n c i p a l l y  as a reaction against 
r a t i onalism per se. This l eaves the way open for a significant 
injection of thought into conservatism: but this can only occur if we
can find a satisfactory definition of rational conduct.
It s hould be remembered that Burke and Oakeshott did try to 
formulate an authentic theory of rational conduct. So we can say that 
it is proper for cons e r v a t i s m  to seek a coherent definition of what can 
be considered rational p o l i t i c a l  behaviour. Regrettably, the 
c o n s e r v a t i v e  theories of Burke and Oakeshott fail because they confuse 
a b e l i e f  in abso l u t e  k n o w ledge (the basis of extreme rationalism) with 
the r a t i o n a l i s m  expounded by many bala n c e d  n o n - c o n s e r v a t i v e  theorists. 
One such theorist today is Karl Popper, and his definition of rational 
conduct may w ell have a practical a p p l i c a t i o n  for conservatism. Popper 
begins by denying that any k n o w ledge can be absolute (and this 
contention is su r e l y  the first p r i n c i p l e  of conservatism). Popper 
asserts that no amount of data pr o v e s  that an o b s e r v a b l e  phenomenon 
w i l l  be repeated - without question - in the future. However, this
does not em a s c u l a t e  rational conduct, according to Popper, as it is 
p ossible to distinguish between verification and falsification. In 
the field of scientific discovery, for example, it has to be admitted 
that an hypothesis cannot be verified absolutely; nevertheless, it is 
p oss i b l e  to attempt to falsify an hypothesis. To take Bertrand 
Russell's famous example: no amount of past obser v a t i o n  proves that 
the sun w ill rise again in the morning; yet it would only take one 
instance of the sun not rising to prove that the hypothesis that the 
sun w ill rise every morning is false.
Falsification, as a practical concept, takes us much further than 
Oakeshott's search for a b solute experience. Whilst falisfication 
c e r t ainly abandones the search for the absolute, it a l l o w s  us to make 
sound and practical judgements. Oakeshott's greatest failing is his 
inability to offer us a satisfactory explanation of how we should 
behave given that the pursuit of philo s o p h y  - the quest for absolute 
experience - is p r o b a b l y  beyond our potential achievement. Moreover, 
fa 1 isfication is far more satisfying to a c o n s e r v a t i s m  based on the 
rejection of perfect kno w l e d g e  because it d e l i b e r a t e l y  abandones the 
search for absolute experience.
Rational conduct, then, is that which takes what is given in 
experience and asks whether it is still appropriate to a particular 
situation. It is neither necessary to adopt a r e v o l u t i o n a r y  prejudice 
against what is giv e n  in experience nor an unquestioning disposition in 
its favour. We are able to judge, according to Popper, whether what 
is given in experience is sti l l  appropriate by asking if it still 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  meets a partic u l a r  need. Rational conduct, in the
p o l i t i c a l  sphere, places human needs first (such as the need for 
protection from physical harm, and the need for food, clothing 
and shelter) and asks not if a form of behaviour is i d e o l o g i c a l l y  sound 
but p r a c t i c a l l y  effective. Let us take a concrete example. Women 
were l a r gely excluded as a group from the po l i t i c a l  life of Britain 
until after the First World War. If, at the time of emancipation, it 
had been required to pro v e  the case for womens p o l i t i c a l  equality, no 
progress would have been made as proof in this sense cannot exist. 
Fortunately, society is wise enough not to ask for such absolute 
verification. Rather the disenfranchisement of women, the given in 
experience at that time, is examined from a practical angle: could 
women not contribute much as a group to the nation (as Queen Victoria 
had contributed much as an i n dividual)? And, significantly, society 
can ask the reactionaries: why are women denied the right to vote? 
Here, any argument based on naked disposition (i.e. they have never had 
it) is given no intrinsic authority.
It is at once apparant that falsification is always a very 
practical judgement. The given in experience is neither to be simply 
rejected nor accepted. Rather, rational conduct requires an open 
criticism of what we find in societal experience. The purpose of 
this criticism is to see if given forms of behaviour can s t ill s o l v e  
contemporary p o l i t i c a l  problems. Have we now arrived at a more 
a c c e p t a b l e  definition of tradition and its purpose within conservatism? 
Popper's theories may em a s c u l a t e  tradition in one sense (that is, if it 
is thought we s hould seek to correspond to a definitive tradition) but 
at least a value is pl a c e d  upon what is given in experience as it
represents always our base data. However, even if we hyjack Popper's 
theories, we s t i l l  have no definite interpretation of tradition. If 
p eople do not agree about the actual character of tradition how can it 
be examined to see if it s t ill meets present needs? Of course 
there is no absolute answer. Tradition, like other elements in our 
p o l i t i c a l  experience, is itself a matter for debate. It is not fixed, 
it does not await mere discovery. If tradition is the tradition of 
man it must always be created by him. Only if tradition is seen as 
something which represents the independent w ill of God (or the material 
process of u n a l t e r a b l e  history) can it be a bsolute and thus beyond 
man's i m m e d i a t e  experience.
Ill
The critical core of c o n s e r v a t i s m  is the rejection of 
absolute knowledge. We can recall that both Burke and Oakeshott 
attacked extreme r a t i o n a l i s m  p r e c isely because they saw it is an 
attempt to conduct p o l i t i c a l  life by independent, scientific principles. 
A prudent c o n s e r v a t i v e ,  then, w ill attack totalitarian ideologies not 
p r i m a r i l y  because of the pr i n c i p l e s  they p r omulgate (although he may 
w e l l  think them repugnant) but because they cla i m  to be a b s o l u t e l y  
valid. The objection is that if one is confronted with such an 
ideo l o g y  no i n t e l l e c t u a l  exchange can take place if it is presupposed 
by its supporters that its v a l i d i t y  is unquestionable. However, 
c o n s e r v a t i s m  must draw the line here: if c o n s e r v a t i s m  goes on to attack 
al l  rationalism, and not just the extreme rationalism which claims 
abs o l u t e  knowledge, it w i l l  degenerate into a mere superstitious 
disposition. This is dangerous because it is u l t i m a t e l y  impotent. If
we find satisfaction in some aspect of our p o l i t i c a l  conduct we should 
not be merely p a s s i v e l y  disposed to it but truly mot i v a t e d  in a 
critical sense to its defence. Only a rational examination of our 
tradition w ill permit this for it is through criticism that we can 
r e a f f i r m .
Because c o n s e r v a t i s m  argues that knowledge cannot be proven in an 
absolute sense, it can l e a v e  itself v u l n e r a b l e  to a negative - that is 
unaffirmed - r eliance on tradition. If this happens cons e r v a t i s m  is 
o v e r w h e l m e d  by the p u e rile desire to preserve. We have already noted 
that mere p r e s e r v a t i o n  can only be credible if we b e l i e v e  in an 
absolute, and a b s o l u t e l y  p e r ceivable, tradition. The danger of this 
contention is obvious: just like totalitarian i d eologies it can admit 
no error. Thus t r a d i t i o n a l i s m  - as distinct from con s e r v a t i s m  - 
becomes an ideology devoted to preserving what is considered an 
a b s o l u t e l y  set way of behaving. In such an ideology, criticism is 
recognised not as a friend but as a deadly enemy.
The n o t i o n  of m e r e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  is u t t e r l y  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  to 
conservatism. C o n s e r v a t i s m  ought to be concerned with protecting what 
Popper c a l l s  the 'Open Society'. The Open Society recognises that no 
k n o w l e d g e  can be a b s o l u t e  and t h e r e f o r e  e v e r y t h i n g  m u s t  be o p e n  to 
question. In our experience, Popper argues, it is the modern liberal 
democracy which recognises the essential role of criticism. If this is 
a c c e p t e d ,  c o n s e r v a t i s m  has as its c ore a b e l i e f  in the e f f i c a c y  of
d e m o c r a c y .  In u p h o l d i n g  the d e s i r a b i l i t y  of an open, d e m o c r a t i c  
society, c o n s e r v a t i s m  escapes the c l utches of a mere disposition 
towards what may be considered traditional. In this context, if we 
are faced with the question of whether cons e r v a t i s m  can exist in the 
Soviet Union or South Africa, we can e m p h a t i c a l l y  deny that this is 
possible. Only if c o n s e r v a t i s m  is defined as pres e r v a t i o n  could such 
a contention be true.
We must now face a crucial question: why protect the Open Society,
and thus democracy, at a l l ?  If we are looking for an a b s o l u t e l y  
certain justification within c o n s e r v a t i s m  then there is o b v i o u s l y  no 
way out as we have burnt our boats with the denial of perfect 
knowledge. In the end we are reduced to a matter of b e l i e f  as we 
abandon the childish search for certainty and the primitive security it 
is thought to bring. This is not a mere disposition: it is a critical
judgement formed after the examination of what is given to us in 
experience. Of course, as the Open Society is not a bsolute it is 
itself subject to critism: but such is our belief in its v i t a l i t y  we 
c a n  be c o n f i d e n t  t h a t  it w i l l  b e n e f i t  f r o m  a n y  h o n e s t  a n d  
con s t r u c t i v e  examination. Indeed we can go further: it is in the act
of examination that the human input required to keep a system r e l e v a n t  
to our needs is provided. A c o n s e r v a t i v e  has to acknowledge that we do
* For Popper, openess inevitably means that Governments will subject themselves to 
genuine review. As he writes 'there are only two kinds of governmental institutions, 
those which provide for change of the government without bloodshed, and those which do 
not. But if the government cannot be changed without bloodshed, it cannot, in most 
cases, be removed at all„.I personally prefer to call the type of government which 
can be removed without violence "democracy", and the other "tyranny". 1
not l ive in a certain world and this ought to be a cause for 
c e l e b r a t i o n  rather than infantile fear. It is the absense of 
certainty which a l l o w s  for human creativity.
IV
C o n s e r v a t i s m  has to be seen as an ideology. More importantly, it 
has to see itself as an ideology. It cannot s a t isfactorily be 
considered a disposition; it is not a neutral place of rest divorced 
from the world of p o l i t i c a l  theory. If it were a disposition it would 
be independent and absolute: it wou l d  be a lamp waiting to be uncovered
within man. Experience shows us that man is disposed to many things: 
some i n t e r n a l l y  conflicting, others differing from man to man. We 
r e a l l y  cannot talk in terms of a d e f i n i t i v e  disposition existing in an 
independent sense. Similarly, just as a sense of disposition within 
man cannot replace the notion of ideology, a social tradition offers no 
a l t e r n a t i v e  harbour. Tradition can never be a separate entity: 
tradition is always and everyw h e r e  the tradition of man. Tradition is 
made by man and not man by tradition. Yet we can acknowledge that 
disposition, in a personal sense, and tradition in a social sense, are 
logical starting points. However, without rational conduct they can 
never be interpreted, developed, affirmed or rejected: indeed they 
cannot exist outside the consciousness of present-day man.
None of this denies the genuine pragmaticism which runs through 
c o n s e r v a t i v e  thought. What has to be admitted is that to be pragmatic 
is s t i l l  an i d e o l o g i c a l  position. Pragmaticism - if defined as the 
practical e v a l u a t i o n  of the l i k e l y  effects of any p o l i t i c a l  action - is
essential for rational conduct. If it is accepted that Popper's 
definition of rational conduct is the most coherent so far offered, the 
act of l e a v i n g  matters open to refutation a u t o m a t i c a l l y  requires one to 
question the effects of a pa r t i c u l a r  action. C o n s e r v a t i s m  does, then, 
differ c o n s i d e r a b l y  from rigid totalit a r i a n  id e o l o g i e s  which see 
t h e m s e l v e s  as perfect and permanent. Here i d eology acts like an 
external skel t o n  which permits no future evolution. C o n s e r v a t i v e  
ideology acts more like an internal s k e lton which gives a basic 
structure to our p o l i t i c a l  behaviour while recognising the l i f e - g i v i n g  
role of change and thus making e v o l u t i o n  possible.
Regrettably, this attitude of mind has often been taken to 
represent weakness or arrant relativism. This view is only v a l i d  if 
c o n s e r v a t i s m  is not attached to firm principles. The commitment to 
defend democratic rights is not undermined by a b e l i e f  that, in the 
strict p h i l o s o p h i c a l  sense, democracy is not a b s o l u t e l y  v e r i f i a b l e  as 
the best regulator of p o l i t i c a l  behaviour. No p o l i t i c a l  theory can be 
verified absolutely. Rather, our commitment is firm: the love of 
democracy is not founded on the mere chance that as a p o l i t i c a l  system 
it happens to be present in our tradition; c r i t i c a l l y  we see 
democracy as necessary for an open, free society. If we f o l l o w  
Popper into his Open Society we are ceta i n l y  not led into feeblenes, 
the f o l l o w i n g  passage on t o l e rence illustrates:
'I do not imply that we s hould always suppress the utterance of 
i n t o l e r a n t  p h i l o s o p h i e s ;  as l o n g  as we c a n  c o u n t e r  t h e m  by 
r a t i o n a l  a r g u m e n t  and k e e p  t h e m  in c h e c k  by p u b l i c  o p i n i o n ,  
suppression would c e r t a i n l y  be most unwise. But we should c l aim 
the right to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may
e asily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level
of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they
may forbid their f o l l o w e r s  to listen to rational argument, because 
it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of 
their fists or pistols.' 2
V
Conservatism, like all other political theories, has to consider 
in detail the proper role of the state. In its simplest form, the most 
important question for a c o n s e r v a t i v e  is what are the legitimate limits
of state action? This question is u s u a l l y  addressed in relation to the
economic role of the state (an area which i n e v i t a b l y  includes many of 
man's practical, material needs); but it is e q u a l l y  valid, in a more 
cosmic sense, to consider if any limitations on temporal power are 
demanded by natural law.
As far as Burke and Oakeshott are concerned the state should be 
limited in economic matters to providing the optimum legal structure 
for the operation of the free market. Neither argues for any 
significant intervention. Burke thought that i n tervention worked 
against the d i v i n e l y  ordained laws of God and, therefore, would 
i n e v i t a b l y  exacerbate suffering. Oakeshott is weary of the dangers 
presented by the concentration of economic power which is required by 
an interven t i o n i s t  state. Taking Burke's view first, the concept of a 
free market being n a t u r a l l y  prescribed - and with it the fatalistic 
b e l i e f  that poverty cannot be e f f e c t i v e l y  a l l e v i a t e d  - u ndoubtedly 
s t i l l  permeates much of c o n s e r v a t i v e  thought today. Yet, it is 
di f f i c u l t  to see how the free market is in any way natural in an 
a b s o l u t e l y  prescribed sense: the free market is a human affectation, it 
is man made and in no way a neutral state of affairs (as Oakeshott
warns - with many others - mo n o p o l i e s  can build up and hence state 
r e gulation is required to maintain free markets). The free market, 
then, cannot enable the state to abdicate its economic
responsibilities. If a free market system, once adequately defined, is 
to be adv o c a t e d  it must be c r i t i c a l l y  justified and not merely regarded 
as the n a t u r a l l y  given in experience.
Now, p r a c t i c a l l y  speaking, if conserv a t i s m  - or any other theory
- accepts as a matter of principle the permanent existence of poverty
one of two conc l u s i o n s  is possible: at worst wicked economic
e x p l o i t a t i o n  w i l l  be condoned; at best a cold indifference w i l l  be
d i s p l a y e d  to the poor. While the latter may not a c t i v e l y  encourage
e x p l o i t a t i o n  it w i l l  s t i l l  go no way to convince critics that
c o n s e r v a t i s m  is anything other than a pragmatic a pologia for the
establishment. C o n s e r v a t i s m  w i l l  be seen, correctly, as an e x c l u s i v e
and hence d i v i s i v e  ideology: and those with a bibl i c a l  bent w i l l  r ecall
that 'Every Kingdom divi d e d  against itself is heading for ruin, and a
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ho u s e h o l d  d i v i d e d  against itself collapses' A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  
if c o n s e r v a t i s m  becomes critical and optimistic then this moribund 
course is avoided. Man, it can be argued, has already done much to 
subdue and dominate his economic environment, and there is no absolute 
reason why poverty, in this specific example, cannot be e v e n t u a l l y  
v a n q u i s h e d .
Oakeshott e l o q u e n t l y  argues that large concentrations of power 
threaten freedom. He also stresses that it is economic power which is 
the main source of power in society. Thus a wide distribution of 
property is to be encouraged through an economic system without
arbitrary constraints on ownership. As a result Oakeshott commends 
c apit a l i s m  as being the surest defender of freedom. However, if this 
argument is not taken any further we are left with a rather diffident 
macro theory which has severe practical limitations. If economic 
power is the kernel of freedom, should the state not seek to a c t i v e l y  
prevent both unduly large and small concentrations of economic power? 
This is not an attempt to justify egalitarianism, but it is an attempt 
to establish the pri n c i p l e  of government intervention in the economy. 
Thus, looking at the economy as a coherent whole, we can argue that 
just as a m onolopy disables a free market, so too does an inordinate 
lack of economic power (poverty) disable indi v i d u a l s  within a free 
market. Of course, the mode of intervention w ill often vary and in 
every case the practical effects of any i n tervention is the most 
important consideration. Conserv a t i s m  ought to charge itself with the 
objective of giving meaning to Burke's assertion that the welfare of the 
poor is the main purpose of government. Using Qakshott's terminology 
c o n s e r v a t i s m  should try to make the whole more of a whole by 
making the i n d i v i d u a l  more of an individual. Indeed we can restate 
this more forcefully: only a society with a h o listic approach can hope
to be free - fragmentation brings for the poor underfu 1 fi 1 1 ment and 
discontent and for the rich indifference and a lack of social unity.
This dialectic, which seeks to revere and improve the given in 
experience, is for Oakeshott the essence of conservatism. Regrettably, 
Oakeshott's commitment is a p urely p hilosophic one; yet in practical 
economic matters it can be argued that this process has already 
esta b l i s h e d  itself in a more critical sense in our tradition. As an
e x a m p l e  we can take the widely held be l i e f  that an i n d i v i d u a l  is 
entitled to the fruit of his own labour. If this went no further in 
reality than a be l i e f  that the in d i v i d u a l  has a right m erely to the 
fruit of his labour as prescribed by a mecurial 'free market', it w i l l  
be considered p r a c t i c a l l y  worthless. It would leave the door open for 
s ocia l i s t s  who argue that ca p i t a l i s m  denies property right through the 
e x p l o i t a t i o n  of labour. Thus many have advocated l e g i s l a t i o n  to 
guarantee a minimum wage and so e s t ablish more firmly the concept of 
property right within c a pitalist society.
It is essential to avoid abso l u t e  principles. The free market, 
for example, has to be defined and underwritten by society: in no way
is it a neutral, spontaneous entity. Similarly, the very notion that 
an i n d i v i d u a l  is ent i t l e d  to the fruit of his own labour (once 
p r o p e r l y  e v aluated) is less than satisfactory as the sole basis for 
economic conduct. In one sense it is repugnant to think that Labour - 
intimately linked to the human person - is just another tradeable 
commodity. More importantly, the very division of labour requires 
always and everyw h e r e  an ordered society. A concept of in d i v i d u a l  
duty to society has to be a c k n o w l e d g e d  for without society no 
c i v i l i z e d  talents could ever be cultivated. Thus when speaking of 
economic freedom one sh o u l d  emphasise the need for a q u a l ified freedom 
that takes into account the duties incumbant on anyone who enjoys 
societal existence.
VI
In considering, here, the place of natural law within C o n s e r v a t i v e  
thought it is best to avoid any general argument about its essential
validity. Rather, it is appropriate in this instance to be limited to 
an examination of the effect the acceptance or rejection of natural law 
has on the fabric of conservatism. In this respect, Burke and 
Oakeshott provide a c o nvenient starting point because their differing 
views span a wide spectrum and thus appear to offer little scope for 
synthesis. Burke e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  advocated a natural law theory 
firmly within the c l a s s i c a l  Christian tradition. Here temporal power 
is seen as merely decl a r a t o r y  and s u b s ervient to a higher moral 
principle. Thus the power of the state is limited. Oakeshott has 
little time for this theory, although, strictly speaking, he condemns 
it only because it claims a standard independent of immediate p o l i t i c a l  
experience. However, Oakeshott does concede that as a summary of 
Christian ph i l o s o p h y  natural law is not without practical value. 
N e v e r theless, Oakeshott thinks that only a fool w ill argue that forms 
of conduct not already estab l i s h e d  within a tradition can be suddenly 
created and made permanent by a legal d eclaration (such as B i l l  of 
Rights). On the one hand, then, we have the view that natural law 
provides an ultimate, u n i v e r s a l  criteria with which to judge the most 
important aspects of p o l i t i c a l  conduct; and on the other hand 
a view that if natural law is in anyway coherent it is so only if it 
i m minently exists within a p a r t i c u l a r  tradition.
Oakeshott's view mirrors his conception of tradition. A l though he 
pays li t t l e  attention to the possi b i l i t y  of a number of traditions 
existing within one society, Oakeshott is parochial in the sense 
that he views traditions as being s t rictly limited to their place of 
origin. As obse r v e d  earlier, this is a rather one-dimensional argument
as it i n e v i t a b l y  maintains that tradition always teaches by positive 
experience. The l i k e l i h o o d  of deprivation, or neg a t i v e  experience, 
leading people to a desired goal is not considered; nor is the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  of there existing a w o rld-wide bank of experience in the 
modern era. Burke's argument for some absolute standards - that is 
natural law - goes some way to breaking out of this one-dimensional 
world-view. Nevert h e l e s s ,  this aspect of Burke's thought has to be 
put in context. In particular, it has to be recognised that for 
Burke natural law was a logical part of a restricted and absolute 
conception of tradition. As a result, whilst Burke was i n n o v a t i v e  on 
matters such as British foreign policy, d o m e s t i c a l l y  his thought led 
to a deep and rather s l o t h f u l  se l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n  which in no way 
assisted the d e v e l o p m e n t  of the modern state.
Many of those who have most s trongly argued for natural law have 
regarded its existence as self-evident. In one respect this is an 
admission of defeat, as the existence of natural law can never be 
verified by any i n t e l l e c t u a l  process - it must remain a matter of 
belief. Yet, the same is true of a l l  world views - the first step is 
one of belief. If natural law is accepted it a l l o w s  us to apply value 
judgement to what we see in our World. Oakeshott's dialectic becomes 
most appropriate in the sense that it argues for an imminent 
affirmation: man must concreate. To be useful, natural law has to be 
vibrant, critical and l i k e l y  to nurture a more alert p o l i t i c a l  
consciousness. If it is considered absolute, as tradition is 
considered by some to be absolute, it is moribund for it w i l l  never be 
understood nor r e v ered and hence never recreated nor reaffirmed in the
consciousness of modern man. Perhaps, then, the most coherent 
conception of natural law is that which sees it as a product of choice 
as man enters more f u l l y  into c i v i l i z e d  consciousness: it is natural in 
a cerebral, not biological, sense. It is to be divorced entirely 
from unthinking traditionalism.
The denial of absolute knowledge does not make a b elief in natural 
law unsustainable. But it does require that b elief to be an immediate 
and c o nstantly reaffirmed belief. Indeed, it is the absence of 
certainty which requires man to affirm natural law and make it an 
imminent, human concept. If this is accepted, natural law forms the 
basis of judgement in imminent conservatism. Of course, this 
judgement is never absolute. Yet within the manifest constraints 
p l a c e d  on man it does a l l o w  him to make objective judgements - that is 
judgements which have not been falsified. This sense of objective 
v a l u e  saves imminent c o n s e r v a t i s m  from the pit of nihilism.
Natural law, if it exists in conserv a t i s m  in this sense, is to be 
identified with mans ability to make rational judgements. It has to 
be associated with man's consciousness and when this consciousness 
is arrested, to a lesser or greater extent, then as a norm it w i l l  lose 
its effectiveness. In this respect one should not be surprised when 
regimes of unfatho m a b l e  wretchedness, such as Nazi Germany, burn books 
and deny the free expression of art. Nevertheless, the one caveat is 
that this b e l i e f  in o b j e c t i v i t y  is still a belief. If it were ever 
decl a r e d  absolute then it would e v e n t i a l l y  lose its existential human 
character. Natural law, thus defined, is not a legalistic doctrine and 
one s hould shy away from any attempt to turn it into a form of
international posi t i v e  law. Rather, those who uphold it should see 
natural law as the soul of civilisation. In this sense, to punish 
i n d i v i d u a l s  for breaking natural law is always to be considered an 
e xtremely dubious undertaking for it is the whole of society that has 
transgressed when babarity, in some measure, is favoured to c i v i l i s e d  
c o n d u c t .
Similarly, a written constitution (or a B i l l  of Rights) is never 
i t s e l f  a d i s t i n c t  f o r m  of n a t u r a l  law. O a k e s h o t t  is c o r r e c t  w h e n  he 
a r g u e s  that it is a r e f l e c t i o n  of w hat s o c i e t y  t h i n k s  d e s i r a b l e  at a 
p a r t i c u l a r  time. H o w e v e r ,  as an e x p r e s s i o n  of b e l i e f  it is q u i t e  
c r i t i c a l  and may o f t e n  be m a d e  in the face of f i e r c e  o p p o s i t i o n  
( O a k e s h o t t  too r e a d i l y  a s s u m e s  t r a d i t i o n  to be uni f o r m ) .  M o r e o v e r ,  a 
w r i t t e n  c o n s t i t u t i o n  may be c o n s i d e r e d  a v e r y  n e c e s s a r y  d e f e n c e  for 
natural law because it draws distinct boundaries. If anyone violates 
these boundaries their action is explicit. As a result society is at 
least given some defence against an insidious, piecemeal erosion of 
natural law. U l t i m a t e l y ,  of course, if natural law is not associated 
with a bsolute t r a d i t i o n a l i s m  the door is always open for possible 
refutation.
Vll
It is now a p p r o p r i a t e  to d r a w  t his s t u d y  to its c o n c l u s i o n .  
C o n s e r v a t i s m  ought to be based on the rejection of absolute knowledge. 
Instead, c o n s e r v a s t i s m  turns to tradition and experience as guides for 
po l i t i c a l  conduct. Despite this, tradition and experience cannot be 
viewed simply as substitutes for rational conduct. Sadly, the 
serious weaknesses in the thought of both Burke and Oakeshott are a
consequence of such a belief. The most fundamental weakness is 
the uncritical, and hence undeveloped, reverence of tradition.
Somewhat paradoxi c a l l y ,  the rejection of absolute knowledge led Burke 
and Oakeshott to view tradition itself as an u l t i m a t e l y  absolute 
concept. To Burke and Oakeshott this is justified by the practical 
identification of r a t i onalism with a b solute knowledge. The result is 
that rati o n a l i s m  - and not merely extreme rationalism - is dismissed 
because it is seen to strive for abso l u t e  verification. So strong is 
this tendency in Oakeshott's thought that on occasions he slips towards 
the pit of n i h i l i s m  (that b l a c k - h o l e  in the universe of man's 
consciousness). Yet, Popper has demonstrated that rationalism can 
a l t e r n a t i v e l y  be identified with the concept of fa 1 isfication; and this 
prov i d e s  a basis for practical rational judgement. Rationalism, to be 
rationalism, need not c l a i m  absolute validity; and as a concept it can 
compl i m e n t  traditional experience.
The idea that c o n s e r v a t i s m  is not an ideology must be rejected.
Of course, this view has great conve n i e n c e  for those who dismiss 
r a t i o n a l i s m  in general; but to see c o n s e r v a t i s m  as a neutral place of 
rest d ivorced from the world of p o l i t i c a l  theories requires an absurd 
b e l i e f  in an absolute disposition. This faith in disposition acts 
like an i n t e l l e c t u a l  anaesthetic and i n e v i t a b l y  places tradition, 
rather than man, at the centre of c o n s e r v a t i v e  thought. The danger 
here is that tradition, the state and even the economy, are seen as 
vague supra-natural entities not dependent on man.
C o n s e r v a t i s m  cannot me r e l y  be a liturgy for cave dwellers. The 
r e j e c t i o n  of a b s o l u t e  k n o w l e d g e  m ust be v i e w e d  as man's g r e a t
opportunity to create for h i m s e l f  what is decent and fulfilling. T.S. 
Eliot (who studied the work of F.H. Bradley as a postgraduate student) 
express as it sublimely in the poem 'Ash Wednesday':
Because I do not hope to know again 
The infirm glory of the positive hour 
Because I do not think 
Because I know I shall not know 
The one veritable transitory power 
Because I cannot drink
There, where trees flower, and springs 
flow, for there is nothing again
Because I know that time is always time
And place is always and only place
And what is actual is actual only for one time
And only for one place
I rejoice that things are as they are and
I renounce the blessed face
And renounce the voice
Because I cannot hope to turn again
Consequently I rejoice, having to construct something 
Upon which to rejoice. 4
Admittedly this is not for the faint hearted. Nevertheless, the 
e v a l u a t i o n  of tradition - which is essential for its effective defence 
- requires a critical, existential theory. However, a concept of 
o b j e c t i v i t y  is not t o t a l l y  lost, but to be a r e l e v a n t  human entity it 
must be based on the pri n c i p l e  of falisfication and not on absolute 
verification. Natural law, when seen as an imminent human concept, 
can give c o n s e r v a t i s m  cons i d e r a b l e  confidence in this respect for it 
serves as the basis of o b j ective judgement. Yet it cannot be a supra- 
natural concept: it is a b e l i e f  affirmed by man (although many
r e l i gious minded pe o p l e  w i l l  agree that man is, if he is honest with
himself, obli g e d  to b e l i e v e  it).
Finally, the proper respect c o n s e r v a t i v e s  have for tradition 
should not be exaggerated to make tradition itself an absolute concept. 
Thus, traditionalism, which to be viable requires an arrest in human 
consciousness, can have no place in an imminent, critical conservatism. 
The mature c o n s e r v a t i v e  w ill view tradition as the basis of wisdom but 
not as a covenant of absolute precedent. The latter would
require a be l i e f  in an absolute and uniform tradition. This is 
incoherent because within a p a rticular country it will be recognised 
that more than one tradition may exist. So, the m u l t i p l i c i t y  of 
traditions can be part of a nation's experience and create distinct 
p o l i t i c a l  imperatives (in the United States, for example, the diverse 
ethnic structure requires the principle of tolerance to be promoted 
for any genuine stability). Another dimension is added when we 
a c k n owledge that it is p o ssible to speak of a worldwide tradition or 
bank of human experience. We live in a World where intercontinental 
communication, trade, i n t e l l e c t u a l  and artistic discourse is now 
commonplace; and ce r t a i n l y  the old world notion of utterly separate 
s o verign states is hardly consistent with the existence of various 
p o l i t i c a l  and economic organisations spanning countries and continents. 
The final dimension, perhaps, is the realisation that - e s p e c i a l l y  in 
the modern world - tradition can teach both in a negative and positive 
manner. As it is p o ssible to cherish a given sense of freedom so too is 
it p o ssible to hunger after an absent freedom.
A coherent conservatism, then, is not concerned with shielding 
man from the uncertainties of his world by idolizing an absolute form 
of p o l i t i c a l  behaviour. Tradition is central to conservatism: but it
is recognised that tradition does not have a simple and unequivocal 
voice. It is a mu 1 1i-dimensiona 1 concept: within any society there are 
various strands of tradition as w ell as genuine disagreements about 
their authentic character. The open society, where all of these 
strands compete in critical debate, is essential for the s u r v i v a l  and 
advancement of freedom: absol u t i s m  - in a l l  its forms - is everywhere 
the enemy. Thus man is required to c r i t i c a l l y  perceive his world as it 
appears now, as it appeared in the past, and as it may appear in the 
future: this is how the past, present and future generations of mankind
are truly united.
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